

**THE EFFECT OF COUNTERTERRORISM ON DOMESTIC SECURITY: A STUDY OF
KENYA'S MILITARY OPERATION IN SOMALIA**

By

OKOTH SANMAC DAVID OWUOR

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DECLARATION

Declaration by the Student

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for award of a degree/diploma in any other university.

Signature..... Date.....
Okoth Sanmac David Owuor, PG/MA/00166/2011

Declaration by the Supervisor

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor.

Signature..... Date.....
Prof. Fredrick Wanyama, PhD.
Department of Political Science, Maseno University

DEDICATION

To my mother Christine and late father Okoth, I owe this Master's Thesis.

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First and foremost, I thank God for bringing me this far. I am, not without God. I acknowledge my very thorough supervisor Professor Fredrick O. Wanyama who is also the Dean School of Development and Strategic Studies (SDSS), Maseno University. Prof. Wanyama actually tamed my research topic and all through, gave me the best supervision from the proposal stage to the finalization of this thesis. I thank Mr. Tom Mboya and Mr. Michael Owiso whose level of contribution to my research cannot be compensated commensurably. God bless all of you including those I have not mentioned.

ABSTRACT

Globally, regionally and nationally states have used counterterrorism to end terrorism and enhance domestic security. Whereas some studies contend that counterterrorism ends or decreases terrorism, others argue it invites retaliations thus an upsurge in terrorism. Despite the debate, on 16th October 2011, Kenya launched “Operation *Linda Nchi*”, a preemptive military operation in Somalia to end Al Shabaab and bolster its domestic security. In June 2012 it terminated the operation and re-hated its troops into AMISOM. Against that background this study sought to investigate the effect of counterterrorism on terrorists and domestic security by examining how the operation affected Kenya’s domestic security. Specific objectives were to: determine the frequency of terror events; determine the costs of terror events; and assess Kenya’s vulnerability to terrorism since the operation was launched. Descriptive and interpretative design was adopted to draw insights on the contribution of counterterrorism on domestic security. Data was obtained from unclassified government documents; books, news reports, journal articles, theses, and institutional reports and key informant interviews. Respondents were purposively selected from Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, National Police Service, Department of Defence, Ministry of East African Community & Tourism, private security, Red Cross, religious organizations, epistemic community, tourists and victims of terrorism using snowball method based on position, knowledge and experience of the operation and terrorism in Kenya. 69 key informants were reached upon data saturation. Through content analysis data was reduced to sets composing a variable. Some were quantified and tabulated to enhance explanation. The study found that between 16th October, 2011 and 30th June, 2015, 126 terror events occurred in Kenya against 9 between 1975 and October 2011; and at very high frequency even than in the United States between 2001 and 2011. Most of them were executed using light weapons such as hand grenades, IEDs, home-made bombs and AK47 guns than bombs and heavy missiles used before. There were 2,607 casualties of which 602 died while 2,005 sustained injuries in the 126 attacks. The year 2015 recorded the highest number of deaths by June alone. Massive destructions of police and KDF vehicles and premises, entertainment clubs, religious places and humanitarian property occurred. Tourism returns fell by 7% in 2014. Several hotels closed down. Unemployment rate rose to 40%. Domestic radicalization and terrorist cells rose up. Workplaces, public transport, religious places and certain residential areas in Nairobi, Mombasa, Garissa, and Mandera were perceived to be more insecure due to terrorism. The findings point to the antithesis of the pre-emptive neutralization theory which contends that counterterrorism ends terrorism or decreases terrorism since the operation was followed by an upsurge in terrorism in Kenya. The study concludes that counterterrorism invites retaliations and upsurge in terrorism thus deteriorates domestic security and recommends that Kenyan should: upscale its intelligence to enhance its ability to detect and intercept terrorists and weapons; cushion susceptible youth from radicalization; beef up security of targets; and review its policy holding KDF forces in Somalia. The public to build resilience. Research with scope beyond June 2015 incorporating classified information be done to advance the conclusions of this study and the intellectual debate.

Table of Contents

DECLARATION	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iv
ABSTRACT	v
List of Tables.....	ix
List of Acronyms & Abbreviations.....	x
Definition of Terms.....	xii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Background to the Study.....	1
1.2. Statement of the Problem.....	6
1.3. Objectives of the Study	7
1.4. Literature Review.....	8
1.4.1. Counterterrorism and Frequency of Terrorism	8
1.4.2. Counterterrorism and the Cost of Terrorism.....	12
1.4.3. Counterterrorism and Vulnerability to Terrorism.....	14
1.5. Assumptions.....	17
1.6. Justification of the Study	17
1.7. Theoretical Framework.....	18
1.7.1. Deterrence Theory	18
1.7.2. Preemptive Neutralization	21
1.8. Methodology	24
1.8.1. Research Design.....	24
1.8.2. Sources of Data	24
1.8.3. Study Area	25
1.8.4. Sampling technique(s)	25
1.8.5. Data Collection	26
1.8.6. Data Analysis and Presentation	28
1.9. Scope and Limitations of the Study.....	30
1.10. Ethical Considerations	31

1.11. Organization of the Study	32
CHAPTER TWO: KENYA’S DOMESTIC SECURITY UNTIL OCTOBER 2011	33
2.1. Introduction.....	33
2.1.1. Concept Domestic Security.....	33
2.2. Historical Analysis of Kenya’s Domestic Security since Independence	35
2.2.1. Emergence of Terrorism in Kenya.....	37
2.2.2. Overt Al Shabaab Terror Activities in Kenya before Operation <i>Linda Nchi</i>	41
2.3. Summary	42
CHAPTER THREE: KENYA’S MILITARY OPERATION IN SOMALIA	44
3.1. Introduction.....	44
3.2. The Operation <i>Linda Nchi</i> Against the Al Shabaab in Somalia	45
3.2.1. Events of Kenya’s Military Operation in Somalia.....	47
3.3. Summary	52
CHAPTER FOUR: FREQUENCY OF TERRORISM IN KENYA SINCE OCT. 2011.....	54
4.1. Introduction.....	54
4.2. The Frequency of Terror Attacks in Kenya from 16 th October, 2011 to Mid-2015	54
4.2.1. Frequency of Terror Events in Various Parts of the Country.....	57
4.2.2. The Frequency of Terror Events by Weapon Types/Event Types.....	58
4.3. Summary.....	63
CHAPTER FIVE: COSTS OF TERRORISM IN KENYA SINCE OCTOBER 2011.....	65
5.1. Introduction.....	65
5.2. Fatalities, Injuries and Kidnappings since the Launch of Operation <i>Linda Nchi</i>	66
5.3. Destruction and Distraction Cost of terrorism since the Launch of the Operation.....	71
5.4. Economic Backlash in Kenya	76
5.4.1. Decline in the Tourism Sector	76
5.4.2. Huge Spending on the Military Operation by Kenya.....	79
5.4.3. Destruction of Businesses and Rise in Unemployment.....	80
5.5. Summary.....	83
CHAPTER SIX: KENYA’S VULNERABILITY TO TERRORISM.....	85
6.1. Introduction.....	85

6.2.	Vulnerability of National Security Organs/Security Departments	85
6.4.	Rise in Domestic Radicalization and Emergence of Terrorist Cells.....	91
6.5.	The Perception on the Effect of Operation <i>Linda Nchi</i> on Domestic Security.....	95
6.5.1.	Workplace and Residential Areas Vulnerability to Terrorism	96
6.5.2.	The Vulnerability of Places of Worship, Recreation and Entertainment.....	102
6.6.	Summary	105
	CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMARRY, CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS.....	106
7.1.	Introduction.....	106
7.2.	Summary of Findings.....	106
7.3.	Conclusion	112
7.4.	Recommendations.....	114
	REFERENCES.....	117
	Appendix A: Interview Schedules for Members of the Public.....	128
	Appendix B: Interview Schedule for Foreign Affairs, Defence and, EAC & Tourism.....	129
	Appendix C: Interview Schedule for Ministry of Interior Affairs, Police & CID.....	130
	Appendix D: Research Permit from Maseno University Ethics Review Committee.....	
	Appendix F: Copy of Proposal Approval from School of Graduate Studies Maseno University.....	

List of Tables

Table 4.1. Frequency of Terror Events in Kenya by Year	55
Table 4.2. Frequency of Terror Events in Various Parts of Kenya Since October 2011.....	57
Table 4.3. Types of Terror Attacks in Kenya since the Launch of Operation Linda Nchi.....	59
Table 4.4. Specific Weapon Used in Terror Attacks in Kenya.....	61
Table 4.5. Frequency of Terror Events in Kenya-July 2013 to June 2014	62
Table 5.1. Fatalities, Injuries and Kidnappings since the Launch of Operation Linda Nchi...	67
Table 5.2. Distribution of Fatalities by Category.....	68
Table 5.3. Distribution of Injuries by Category.....	69
Table 5.4. Terror Kidnappings in Kenya since the Launch of Operation Linda Nchi.....	70
Table 5.5. Destruction of Facilities since the Launch of Operation Linda Nchi.....	72
Table 5.6. State Security Bases Destroyed since the Launch of Operation Linda Nchi.....	73
Table 5.7. Activities Disrupted since the Launch of Operation Linda Nchi.....	74
Table 5.8. Business Premises Destroyed in Terror Events since 16 th October 2011.....	81

List of Acronyms & Abbreviations

ATPU	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
CISA	Catholic Information Service for Africa
EAC	East Africa Community
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KNCHR	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MYC	Muslim Youth Centre
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization

START	Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism
UN	United Nations
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
US	United States (of America)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
VIED	Vehicle Improvised Devise
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Definition of Terms

- Al Shabaab:** A radical youth wing of Somalia's now-defunct Union of Islamic Courts (ICU) which has been carrying out terrorism in Somalia and has been blamed and equally claimed responsibility for terrorist acts in Kenya and other neighbouring countries.
- Anti-terrorism:** Proscriptive legislations or amendments to the law that allow pursuit, arrest and prosecution of terrorists and; security measures put in place to detect and ward off terrorists.
- Cost of Terrorism:** Deaths, injuries, kidnapping, destruction to property, disruption of events, and economic and financial losses as a result of terrorism.
- Counterterrorism:** Using military force to fight against identified/suspected terrorist group operating from another country by a country faced with actual or potential terrorist threat from the extremists as a way of bolstering its security.
- Domestic security:** The state of safety and peace (from terrorism) of the civilians, the government, public and private property; and level of resilience and capacity to handle any threat to safety, peace and stability of the country in form of theft, banditry, robbery, arson, treason, terrorism.
- Operation *Linda Nchi*:** The name of and Kenya's military operation carried out in Somalia in pursuit of the Al Shabaab from 16th October 2011 up to June

2012 in order to deter the terrorist group from crossing over into Kenya.

Terrorism: Violent acts or the threat of violence intended to create fear (terror), perpetrated for an economic, religious, political, or ideological goal by a group of extremist, radical criminals, and which deliberately target or disregard the safety of non-combatants (neutral military personnel, the police and civilians).

Vulnerability to Terrorism: Capacity or weakness that can be exploited by terrorists such as low capacity of security organs, security weakness or deficiency at a facility, entity, venue, or of a person; the level of fear created by terrorists among the public and low perception of the people on efforts put by their government to fight terrorism which affect their resilience to terrorism; and the level of social threat arising from publicity terrorists have gained for their causes.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background to the Study

Globally, transnational terrorism has been a threat to domestic security of states especially after the September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda terror attack in New York (Sedra and Burt 2001, pp.1-18). In Northern America, the United States has faced the Al Qaeda and the Taliban with roots mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan and areas of operation across the world including Egypt, Sudan and Somalia for their networks in African. The Al Qaeda and its networks was responsible for the 1998 US Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the September 11, 2001 terror attack of the World Trade Centre (The Pentagon) in New York. These attacks left many people killed, injured and terrified. A lot of property was destroyed therefore disrupting the economy leaving its nuclear installations more vulnerable to terrorism (Nagel, 2002; Oudraat, 2004).

Similarly, the Al Qaeda bombed London in 2006 leaving similar costs behind. In response, the United States and Britain sent troops abroad to countries suspected to be the operation bases of the terrorist groups including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq sure to clear the terrorists, reduce terror events; the resulting costs; and enhance their security at home and of their citizens abroad (Menkhaus, 2012; Stephenson, 2010; Throupe, 2012). However, recent studies indicate that the US is more vulnerable to terror attacks than it was by September 10, 2001 (Wagner, 2014).

In Africa, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea in East Africa have faced transnational terrorism. The Boko Haram, which is linked to both Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab, has executed the highest number of terror attacks in Nigeria. These have resulted in deaths and injuries, kidnaps, destruction of public and private property, paralysis of operations

and sabotage of the economy through attacks on oil fields, processing plants, strategic installations and the police (Ogunrotifa, 2014; NCST, 2014).

In East Africa, the collapse of the central or national government in Somalia, which occurred in 1991, has posed great challenge to the countries in its neighbourhood and those far and beyond. This elicited, as well, significant attention from various states and the United Nations which sought to assist in rebuilding the state. The tension was manifested in the various operations by the United Nations (UN), especially between 1992 and 1995, such as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) of August 1992, which failed thus warranting the US intervention to support UNOSOM I. This intervention saw the formation of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in December 1992, with the mandate to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians and to protect food deliveries from warlord attacks. UNOSOM II replaced UNITAF in 1993 and withdrew in 1996 (Alemu, 2014, p. 56).

The withdrawal of UNOSOM II allowed a number of terrorist groups to take control of Somalia. This made neighbouring states vulnerable to terrorism since the groups were able to facilitate terrorist attacks in the region (Okwir, 2015; Mbugua, 2015; Cheboi, 2013; Menkhaus, 2012; Libuta, 2009). In reaction, in 2006, Ethiopia entered Somalia to fight the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) (Zeray, 2007). Contrastingly, Kenya opted for mediating between the conflicting parties in the failed state. It played a significant role in the Somali peace process by hosting peace talks (2002–2004) and providing a base from which the TFG operated until it moved to Mogadishu in 2005 despite the cross-border dispute with Somalia (the *Shifto Wars*) between 1963 and 1967. (Okwir, 2015).

However, the security situation in Somalia and of countries in the region did not improve as such, with terrorism occurring at a higher frequency. As people were watching the 2010 FIFA World Cup on 10th of July, 2010, the Kyadongo rugby club in Kampala, Uganda, was bombed, leaving 74 people lifeless and more than 60 injured. The Al Shabaab took credit in the attack (Okwiri, 2015; Mbugua, 2015).

While it is admitted that there had been terror attacks which left behind certain costs in Kenya even before Somalia degenerated into anarchy, the frequency and costs of terrorism in the country after 1991 were higher and greater as the country's vulnerability to terrorism increased. From 1975 to 16th October 2011, Kenya had experienced 9 notable terror attacks, with 3 occurring at large intervals, one in every decade from the 1970s, 80s and 90s. The other 6 occurred within one decade: between 2002 and 2011, and were attributed to terrorist cells operating from Somalia or individuals with roots in Somalia (NCTC, 2015; START, 2013; Maumo, 2009; Kagwanja, 2007). These events left a total of 363 people dead, with thousands injured and a lot of damage to property, disruption of events, functions and transport, and heavy economic losses (Wallis, 2000).

However, the emergence of Al Shabaab, as a transnational terrorist group based in Somalia but carrying out terror activities in the Eastern African region, up-scaled Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism. Its affiliation with the Al Qaeda enhanced its capacity to achieve both its nationalistic and transnational goal. Al Qaeda would improve Al Shabaab's battle tactics training, funding, and branding and recruitment, making its attacks so well-coordinated as to be directed to states in the region as targets. They began to use suicide bombings, which were foreign to Somalis by 2006, and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), instead of assassinations (Okwir, 2015, pp. 58-60).

In response to transnational terrorism, Nigeria, Uganda and Ethiopia, along with Burundi and Eritrea, had contributed troops to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) forces in Somalia, but this was as ineffective as its successor, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Since 2007, AMISOM had been fighting Al Shabaab, hoping to create an effective government in Somalia and enhance security. With the ineffective performance of AMISOM, in 2010, Ethiopia launched several military operations in Somalia through Kenyan territory, hoping to reduce terrorism in its jurisdiction and enhance its domestic security. However, Al Shabaab's affiliation to Al Qaeda improved its capacity against AMISOM. Its sniper activity against AMISOM and the Transitional Federal Government greatly increased (Cheboi, 2013; Menkhaus, 2012).

In its approach, internally, Kenya for a long time adopted anti-terrorism strategies alone in response to terrorism. These involved anti-terrorism law enforcement and chucking out illegal immigrants; changing personnel at the Department of Police, Immigration and Registration of Persons and at the National Intelligence Service; increasing anti-piracy surveillance along the coast; deploying the military to terror prone areas; and, recently, constructing a barrier wall along its borders with Somalia (Nduwimana, 2013, pp. 31-40).). Externally, to deal with the security challenges it was facing as a result of the absence of an effective government in Somalia, Kenya formed alliance with and built the capacity of at least six Somali militia allies namely: Ras Kamboni, the TFG; the self-declared "Azania" regional administration, also known as Jubaland Initiative; the Isiolo militia; the Al-Sunna Wal Jamma militia and Gedo region clan militia to create a buffer state to deter Al Shabaab from crossing into Kenya (Cheboi, 2013; Alemu, 2014; Okwir, 2015).

However, certain scholars have contended that there are no clear linkages or indicators of Kenya's initiatives and their enhancement of the state's national, regional and global security. Kenya did not have a blue print or 'White paper' that clearly linked its intervention policy/strategy to defence and foreign policies or the Vision 2030, which define national interests and development goals. This created room for guesswork and roadside policy decision.

The country had therefore been vulnerable to counter-productive and ineffective decisions against the national interests (Mbugua, 2015, p. 15). By 16th October 2011, the Al Shabaab had managed to cross over into Kenya and carried out several terror events in North Eastern Region of Kenya and in Eastleigh – 'Little Mogadishu' in Nairobi. The two places had been dominated by people of Somali origin and had become uncontrollable for Kenyan authorities (Menkhaus, 2012, p. 2).

In October 2011, the transnational terrorist group overtly crossed into Kenya and kidnapped tourists and humanitarians along the Lamu coast and Dabaab refugee camp, respectively (Cheboi, 2013; Warner, 2012). In a pre-emptive reaction despite lack of a properly outlined strategy, on 16th October, 2011 Kenya launched a military operation named Operation *Linda Nchi*, meaning 'Operation Protect the Nation', in pursuit of the Al Shabaab (transnational terrorists) in Somalia.

After a "successful" operation, as it was declared by the Chief of Defense Forces, the KDF troops in Somalia were integrated into AMISOM in June, 2012 (Warner, 2012). The military operation was expected to lead to the end of Al Shabaab or create a buffer zone (which IGAD had failed to create under the Azania (Jubaland Initiative) to reduce its ability to penetrate and carry out terror attacks in Kenya, hence enhance the country's security (Cheboi, 2013; Menkhaus, 2012).

Studies conducted on the use of anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism approaches to transnational terrorism by states in North America (United States) and in Europe (Britain) have ended up in unresolved debates on the utility of either of the approaches. Studies on Operation *Linda Nchi* are few and none specifically tackles the effect of counter-terrorism on terrorism or domestic security, hence none has any information on how the Operation *Linda Nchi* affected the frequency of terror events and the resulting costs of terrorism, in terms of deaths, injuries, kidnappings, destruction of property, including public infrastructure/utilities, disruption of events, systems and operations, including transport and communication and the economy.

In addition, the studies exhibited a dearth of information on how the military operation had affected Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism after the operation. This is in terms of inter alia, capacities of internal security organs, the security of strategic installations in the country and the perception of the people in Kenya on the terrorism situation in the country since the military operation was carried out.

This is so because most of the studies have only looked at the operation from the perspective of foreign military intervention, with deviation from counter-terrorism. Others have attempted to explain the causes and consequences of the operation without aligning the findings to the stated main reason for Kenya's military operation in Somalia, which was to pursue Al Shabaab, the transnational terrorists which had attempted to execute certain terror events in Kenya.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Recent studies indicate that the global struggle against terrorism is far from over. This has led to increased vulnerability of states to terrorism. The United States for example is more vulnerable to terrorism than before the September 11, 2001 despite it numerous counter-terrorism activities

on suspected terrorists abroad (Wagner, 2014; Friedman, Harper and Preble, 2010). While a number of terror attacks had been recorded in Kenya between 1975 and 16th October, 2011, it had not carried out military operation on suspected terrorists abroad. However, faced with threats of Al Shabaab terror attacks preceded by its overt cross-border kidnappings, on 16th October 2011, Kenya deployed its defence forces (KDF) across the border into Somalia to pursue the Al Shabaab single-handedly (Alemu, 2014; Cheboi, 2013; Menkhaus, 2012). The operation was aimed at destroying the Al Shabaab completely or greatly reduce its capacity to wage attacks in Kenya. However, the launch of the operation provoked the Al Shabaab which declared it would carry out reprisal attacks on Kenya's soil. Whereas the KDF was re-hatted into AMISOM in 2012 after the "successful" operation, existing studies have not explained its effect on terrorism in Kenya, particularly on the frequency and costs of terrorism, and the country's vulnerability to terrorism. Thus, generalized conclusion on the effect of counter-terrorism on domestic security cannot be attempted. This study, therefore, sought to investigate the effect of counter-terrorism on domestic security, studying how Kenya's military operation in Somalia has affected the frequency and costs of terrorism in the country and its vulnerability. The main question the study sought to answer was: To what extent does counter-terrorism enhance the domestic security of a state facing transnational terrorism threat? How has Operation *Linda Nchi* affected terrorism in Kenya?

1.3. Objectives of the Study

The study sought to determine the effect of counterterrorism on domestic security by studying how Kenya's military operation on Al Shabaab in Somalia affected the state of terrorism in Kenya. Specifically, the study sought to:

- i. Determine the frequency of terror events in Kenya since Operation *Linda Nchi* was launched;
- ii. Determine the cost of terrorism in Kenya since Operation *Linda Nchi* was launched; and
- iii. Assess Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism since Operation *Linda Nchi* was launched.

1.4. Literature Review

Inasmuch as there are several studies conducted on the use of counterterrorism globally more so by the United States and Israel, conclusions drawn from the findings tend to disagree on whether the counterterrorism strategies increased terrorism or reduced it either in the short-run or in the long-run. On the other hand, whereas there is a number of studies conducted around Kenya's military operation in Somalia, none of them was based on has attempted to discuss or explain the linkage between counterterrorism and domestic security; none of them has evaluated the operation based on the aim of carrying it specifically how it has affected terrorism in Kenya outlining specific indicators such as the frequency and cost of terrorism and the state of the country's vulnerability to terrorism since the operation was launched. However, with focus on the objectives of this study, available literature were reviewed.

1.4.1. Counterterrorism and Frequency of Terrorism

Stephenson (2010) states that counter-terrorism aims to eliminate terrorism and to prevent escalation of terrorism. This argument is valid to the extent that it is quite in line with the stated objective of Kenya's military operation on Al Shabaab in Somalia; therefore, it enhances our understanding of Kenya's intended outcome of the operations, therefore, a basis of the study. However, Stephenson's argument is rather abstract since it does not provide deeper insight, empirically and with indicators, into how counter-terrorism eliminates terrorism or prevents its

escalation. It does not explain how counter-terrorism affects the frequency of terrorism, which is the salient indicator of terrorism. Furthermore, in the broader context of the study, Stephenson's argument is one-sided in its conclusion on the utility of counter-terrorism.

Ganor (2005) adds that military operation is carried out with the desire to eradicate terrorists by removing the incentive to commit terrorist acts and use violence. This is so as to destroy the terrorist organization or reduce the number of future attacks or to prevent certain types of attacks, and may be carried out as a way of preventing escalation of terrorism. The contribution Ganor (2005) makes is that in studying counterterrorism, the outcome may be immediate, certain aspects may manifest only with time and that it may affect but only certain types of attacks which unfortunately Ganor (2005) does not specify, making the argument merely assumptive as well. (pp. 25-6).

Sandler (2005) observed, the use of proactive measures weakens the ability terrorists to operate and subsequently reducing the occurrence of attacks. This arguments proved useful to the study in that it links the effect of the operation on the terrorists with the frequency of terrorism. However, Sandler (2005) hardly gives empirical examples therefore his argument is not precisely empirically analytical.

Researches carried out on the US raid in Libya coined 'Operation El Dorado Canyon' of 15th April, 1986 have resulted in divergent conclusions. Enders (1994) and posits that the US raid in Libya reduced terrorism. This conclusion is supported by Prunckun and Mohr (1997). However, they explain the state of terrorism in Libya than in the United States which raided terrorists in Libya in an attempt to bolster its security at home.

On the contrary, Silke (2005) contends that the raid instead increased terrorism (p. 56). Similarly, Lum, Lesley & Alison (2006) contends that the attack on Libya resulted in a statistically significant increase in the number of terrorist attacks. Similarly, these divergent findings are not on the state of terrorism in the United States which engaged in the raid but on Libya where the terrorists resided (p. 5).

Notably, these divergent findings are not on the state of terrorism in the United States which engaged in the raid. They are, rather, on Libya, where the terrorists resided. While qualitative study, more so in social science, may at times exhibit different results which may not necessarily be generalized, these divergent findings and conclusions on the same phenomenon begs further study to determine how counter-terrorism affects terrorism.

Sanico and Kakinaka (2007) also charged that the use of force in response to a terrorist campaign may perpetuate the cycle of violence instead of decreasing it (p. 7). Malvesti (2002) concluded that military option is a blunt, ineffective instrument that creates a “cycle of vengeance” (p. 5).

Dotani (2011) adds that counterterrorism may promote the culture of terrorism as in the case of Talibanization in Pakistan with a changing terror tactics, manifestations such as ambushes on security departments, and wider targets (p. 6). These findings, just like in Libya indicate the consequences within the state where the transnational terrorists reside but not the state in hot pursuit of the terrorists. But this study enhances the previous arguments since it is empirically analytical identifying certain types of terror attacks.

Mbugua (2015) charges that in Eastern African countries: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti are more vulnerable to transnational terrorism due to political instability, ethnic and communal violence, pervasive corruption, widespread poverty,

and high rates of unemployment and underemployment, porous borders and countries lack the capacity to effectively monitor the borders, which is a gap that can be exploited by terrorist groups to establish training bases for their members and/or to transport and distribute weapons, across the sub-region which terrorists exploit (p. 15). While the observations are valid, Mbugua (2015) talked about Eastern Africa as a whole whereas the countries have at times pursued regional security variously depending on their peculiar national interests, moreover, Mbugua (2015) cannot purportedly be used to understand whether Kenya's military operation in Somalia enhanced Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism or deteriorated it.

With respect to Kenya's Operation *Linda Nchi*, findings of START Global Terrorism Database (2013) show that by February 2012, almost one-quarter of Al Shabaab terror attacks (22.7%) took place in Kenya, primarily in Garissa (13 attacks), Nairobi (8 attacks), Wajir (4 attacks), Mandera (4 attacks), and Ifo (4 attacks) (p. 3). The most commonly used tactics by the Al Shabaab include bombings and armed assaults, which comprise 72.6 percent of their attacks (ibid). This study was carried out to identify or profile Al Shabaab as a transnational terrorist. In addition, it was not conducted to determine the effect of counterterrorism on terrorism in Kenya.

Menkhaus (2012) appreciates that the military operation on Al Shabaab in Somalia was executed following proliferation of a spate of cross-border kidnappings of Western tourists and aid workers by terrorists which devastated tourism along Kenya's northern coast provoked Kenya to act. This operation was aimed at destroying the Al Shabaab and their affiliations in Somalia, clearing Kenya-Somalia borders of Al Shabaab and creating a buffer zone to defend Kenya should the Al Shabaab initiate reprisal attacks (p. 3). However, this study was carried out at the time the operation was still going on. Moreover, the study concentrated on the "battle" and what transpired in the "battlefield", that is the KDF-Al Shabaab fight in Somalia. Therefore it does not

give a picture of what resulted from the operation in terms of the frequency of Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya, the resulting costs and the country's vulnerability to terrorism, a gap this study sought to fill.

Odhiambo, Kassilly & Malito (2012), observe that the main goal of the operation was to disrupt and possibly end the threats the terrorists posed to its domestic security. However, while they reassert Kenya's mission in Somalia, they do not explain whether the operation actually achieved its intended mission that is, destruction of the terrorists and the resultant state of terrorism in Kenya in terms of frequency, a gap this study sought to close.

The findings of the studies referred to above may not be replicated for the scenario against which this study was carried out. In them, there is lack of unanimity on the effect of counter-terrorism on the frequency of terrorism. On the one hand, some of the findings show that military operation can significantly reduce terrorism, and if it increases, this may not last long. On the other hand, some conclude that counter-terrorism leads to significant increase in terrorism and that if it decreases, this may only be in the short-run.

These findings leave us in stalemate: the study wonders the extent to which military counter-terrorism can enhance domestic security. Thus the study questions the utility of military operation in combating terror. But it does this as it reviews more literature on the context of Kenya's recent operation in Somalia.

1.4.2. Counterterrorism and the Cost of Terrorism

Stephenson (2010) contends that one of the aims of counterterrorism is to minimize damage caused by terrorism. However, Stephenson does not outline specific damage including but not

limited to fatalities, casualties, people kidnapped, economic and social costs common to terrorism including but not limited to damage done to property and infrastructure. The proximate cause of Kenya's military operation on the Al Shabaab was the kidnapping of tourists and humanitarians by the transnational terrorists in Kenya's jurisdiction whose effects were social and economic in nature.

Dotani (2011) agreeably posits that counterterrorism may promote the culture of terrorism as in the case of Talibanization in Pakistan resulting in killing of religious, political and civil society figures, scholars and doctors; blowing up schools, offices of NGOs, bridges and pillions; suicide attacks in churches and other important places leaving more than 35000 civilian Pakistani dead in different incidents of terrorism (p. 6).

While Dotani (2011) identifies specific costs of terrorism, Dotani's study did not focus on the costs in the United States of America and therefore the study did not focus on transnational terrorism, hot pursuit and the resulting state of terrorism in the pursuing state, the basis of this study.

Enders, Sandler & Cauley (1990) also observed that the Libyan attack affected non-casualty events, threats and miscellaneous bombings attacks such as hijackings, hostage events, and events which led to death or wounded individuals. While Enders et al. (1990) certain types of terror events that can guide the study on indicators of terrorism and the cost of terrorism, the findings differ in context with this study. The stated resultant effects were felt in Libya not in the United States which had carried out military operation.

With respect to Kenya's military operation on the Al Shabaab in Somalia START Global Terrorism Database (2013) showed that the targets of Al Shabaab attacks were quite varied,

most frequently affecting private citizens and property (25.9%), military (22.4%), general government (13.9%), police (9.9%), businesses (5.1%), diplomatic entities (4.0%), and journalists and media (4.0%)(START, Global Terrorism Database, 2013, p. 2).

While this study confirms that Al Shabaab carried attacks with the aim of making the targets undergoes untold suffering with great costs, the study was a global study and was aimed at profiling Al Shabaab as a global terrorists therefore did not narrow down to Kenya alone. In addition, the study focused on Al Shabaab as a terrorists group with data not focused on relation to or with counterterrorism. This study on the other hand was focused on assessing the costs of terrorism following counterterrorism.

(Okwir, 2015) identifies varied costs of terrorism as economic or social; direct or indirect; physical or psychological; and individual or community. Further, he charges that the costs may be incurred as a result of physical injury, theft, damage or destruction of property; alteration of demographic composition of society and huge financial implications and burden to the affected countries; erosion of inter-communal trust; and destroys social cohesion and integration (social capital) a *sine qua non* for national development. However, the study did not outline the specific costs of terrorism in Kenya as to the number of deaths and casualties for example.

1.4.3. Counterterrorism and Vulnerability to Terrorism

Vulnerability to terrorism is viewed in terms of exploitable capability; an exploitable security weakness or deficiency at a facility, entity, venue, or of a person and the low perception of the people based on the level of terrorism which affects their resilience to terrorism; and the level of fear created among the public by terrorism in terms of their view on the government's strategy

and its ability to combat terrorism and the extent of publicity terrorists have gotten for their causes.

Reese (2013) posits that vulnerability to terrorism can manifest in any incident that might offer a potential threat to the population and their property, public or private and or derail the efforts of the government to prevent and contain insecurity (Reese, 2013). Kenaan (2014) adds that the threats may also be perceived to be potential or actual, irrespective of the vulnerability status as per standards as to high, medium or low (Kenaan, 2014).

Kagwanja (2007) notes that terrorism has become the greatest threat to security within states in the Horn of Africa, increasing their vulnerability to terrorism (Kagwanja, 2007, p. 3). This was before and in fact the background against which, Kenya executed Operation *Linda Nchi* warranting a study to assess the effect of counterterrorism on domestic security, the gap this study sought to bridge.

Menkhaus (2012) observes that Kenya's decision in 2010 to allow Ethiopian troops to invade the Al Shabaab in Somalia via Kenyan territories along its border with Somalia subsequently led to increased Al Shabaab violence in northern Kenya in 2011. In addition, the Somali dominated Eastleigh in Nairobi also largely became 'beyond the control' of Kenyan authorities, serving as a center of Al Shabaab recruitment and fund-raising (Menkhaus, 2012, p. 3). The arguments of Menkhaus (2012) helps the study to understand Al Shabaab's contribution to Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism and can only provide an empirical baseline for the study but cannot suffice response as to how Operation *Linda Nchi* might have changed Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism.

Sanico and Kakinaka (2007) contend that the rationale behind counterterrorism is that to not respond aggressively or to concede to terrorist demands would earn a state a reputation as soft on terrorism. Sanico and Kakinaka's argument can be used to interrogate and understand the basis of Kenya's military operation in Somalia. For this reason Kenya's decision to pursue the Al Shabaab in Somalia aimed to reduce Kenya's vulnerability to Al Shabaab attacks.

Menkhaus (2012) argues that by the time Kenya began its military incursions into Somalia in hot-pursuit of the Al Shabaab, the Al Qaeda-linked terrorist gang operated mainly in southern and central Somalia particularly with bases in Afmadou, Baidoa, Kismayo and Bulo Hawa (Menkhaus, 2012). However, Menkhaus (2012) does not highlight how the proximity of these bases affected Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism.

Laibuta (2009) argues that the existence of the Al Shabaab in Somalia with its bases in Southern Somalia near Somalia-Kenya borders demonstrated Al Shabaab's capacity to strike beyond Somalia into Kenya. This gives a justification for the basis of Kenya's decision to pursue the Al Shabaab into Somalia (p. 9). However, this study was conducted before Kenya launched Operation Linda Nchi therefore the need to assess Kenya's vulnerability to Al Shabaab after the operation, a core objective of this study.

Alemu (2014) and Miyandazi (2012, p. 5) attempt to discuss domestic radicalization in Kenya but the two depart from the problem of this study in that they argue that the strategy ended up alienating the Kenyans of Somali ethnic group. However, they do not relate that to the resulting security threats such as the increase in radicalization and in Al Shabaab financiers and sympathizers; neither do they relate their findings to intense terror attacks in Kenya (Alemu, 2014, p. 81).

Ichani (2014) argues that Kenya's military operation on the Al Shabaab was successful (p. 41). Ichani (2014) like many military men who have authored books and articles could have praised the KDF with biasness therefore calling for an independent academic inquiry into the operation and its effect on terrorism in Kenya.

In conclusion, available literature on Operation Linda Nchi show that the studies looked at the operation from the perspective that it was a foreign intervention; a conventional warfare; with concentration on whether it was ethical; its psychological consequences on the soldiers; and the ethical aspects of it.

1.5. Assumptions

The following assumptions can be drawn from the existing literature:

- i. Counterterrorism ends terrorism or greatly reduce therefore enhances domestic security.
- ii. Counterterrorism invites a cycle of retaliations increasing terrorism therefore cannot enhance but deteriorates domestic security.

1.6. Justification of the Study

Since Kenya launched the Operation *Linda Nchi* against the Al Shabaab in Somalia, citing Al Shabaab threats to its domestic security, therefore its right to self-defence, there is no study or official report that has explained how the operation has affected terrorism in Kenya in terms of the frequency of terrorism, the costs of terrorism and the Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism.

This study has attempted to bridge that gap. The study addresses the dearth of knowledge that had left many in limbo, with travel warnings issued by Western countries from where foreign tourists come to Kenya thus undermining its tourism sector as well as scaring everyone. Further,

it inspires academic research from the same or different approach on the operation. More importantly, the study can be used by citizens to understand the state of terrorism and, therefore, public safety in the country in an attempt to relate Kenya's decision and action to pursue the Al Shabaab in Somalia. The findings illustrate the changing nature of domestic security, with terrorism on the rise as demonstrated by the increased number of terror events and the resulting repercussions. Furthermore, the findings can help the government to develop an integrated policy linking its internal security, defence and foreign policy strategies. The findings delineate the study as one of its own kind. Broadly, the study has attempted a conclusion to the theoretical debate on the utility of military counter-terrorism.

1.7. Theoretical Framework

The following International Relations (IR) theories have been explored to arrive at the most suitable one that can be used to exclusively understand or analyze terrorism and military counterterrorism.

1.7.1. Deterrence Theory

The use of military threats as a means to deter international crises and war has been a central topic of international security research for decades. In international relations: security studies and foreign affairs, deterrence is a strategy aimed at dissuading an adversary from undertaking an action not yet started, or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires. In this case, deterrence is understood in the perspective of statist (Zagrare, 2004; Huth, 1999).

Deterrence theory gained ascendancy in military practice in the Cold War with respect to the use of nuclear weapons. It took on a unique connotation during this time as an inferior nuclear force, by virtue of its extreme destructive power. It could deter a more powerful adversary, provided

that this force could be protected against destruction by a surprise attack (Brodie, 1959, pp. 264–304). In this respect, military strategy was now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence (Schelling, 1966, pp. 1–34). In a nutshell, the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the foundation of deterrence theory, and is most successful when it is held in reserve (*ibid*). In addition, in its application, deterrence denotes the use of threats by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action. A threat serves as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the intended action because of the costs and losses that target would incur. In international security, deterrence could be in the form of threats of military retaliation directed by a state in an attempt to prevent the adversary from resorting to the threat of use of military force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals (Huth, 1999).

The technicality in the applicability of deterrence in international security is its traditional sense: it was mainly used in the cold war period and that its specific tool is nuclear weaponry (Zagrare, 2004). It is held that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through the promise of retaliation and possibly mutually assured destruction (MAD). Nuclear deterrence can also be applied to an attack by conventional forces; for example, the doctrine of massive retaliation threatened to launch US nuclear weapons in response to Soviet attacks (*ibid*).

According to Jentleson & Whytock (2005), two key sets of factors for successful deterrence are important being (i) a defending state strategy that firstly balances credible coercion and deft diplomacy consistent with the three criteria of proportionality, reciprocity and coercive credibility, and secondly minimizes international and domestic constraints; and (ii) the extent of an attacking state’s vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and economic conditions. In

broad terms, a state wishing to implement a strategy of deterrence is most likely to succeed if the costs of non-compliance it can impose on, and the benefits of compliance it can offer to, another state are greater than the benefits of noncompliance and the costs of compliance (pp. 47–86).

In furtherance of deterrence from a rationalist's perspective, Huth (1999) notes that both supporters and critics of rational deterrence theory agree that an unfavourable assessment of the domestic and international status quo by state leaders can undermine or severely test the success of deterrence. In a rational choice approach, if the expected utility of not using force is reduced by a declining status quo position, then deterrence failure is more likely, since the alternative option of using force becomes relatively more attractive (pp. 25-8).

There are several criticisms leveled against deterrence theory in its classical sense. In his analysis, Zagrare (2004) argued that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent, not empirically accurate and deficient as a theory. In campaign for rational deterrence, some scholars have argued for 'perfect deterrence,' which assumes that states may vary in their internal characteristics and especially in the credibility of their threats of retaliation (pp. 110-16). In addition, the escalation of perceived threat can make it easier for certain measures to be inflicted on a population by its government, such as restrictions on civil liberties, the creation of a military industrial complex and military expenditures resulting in higher taxes and increasing budget deficits. Even former key proponents of classical deterrence including many mainstream politicians, academic analysts, and retired military leaders have criticized deterrence. We join in critiquing the theory adding that its unsuitability for analysis in this study is also inherent on its rigidity in that it applies to a situation where both adversaries have the status of sovereign states,

with the belligerents clearly identified, in a formal war situation guided by mutually acceptable rules of confrontation, unlike the case where adversary is transnational terrorist gang.

1.7.2. Preemptive Neutralization

According to Buzan (1991), security denotes the “pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile.” In this context, it is about survival in which security threat is a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence: significant enough to warrant emergency action and exceptional measures including the use of force (Buzan, 1991).

It is against this background that preemptive neutralization emerges as an approach to terrorism, a threat to national security, which Buzan (1991) terms as military threat (Buzan, 1991, pp. 432-433). Preemptive neutralization is an off-shoot of political realism. Preemptive neutralization gained ascendancy when President Ronald Reagan shifted focus from concentration of reducing the spread of nuclear technology even to smaller states (Hoffman, 1998; Nagel, 2002). The new focus was on how to deal with transnational actors such as terrorists which threatened the security of the US from abroad (even with the possibility of acquiring and using nuclear weapons against the U.S.) (Jentleson et al., 2005; Stephenson, 2004; Zagrare, 2004; and Huth, 1999).

Reisman (2006) contends that preemptive neutralization is driven by the claim to preemptive self-defense, a claim to entitlement to use unilaterally, without prior international authorization, high levels of violence to “arrest an incipient development that is not yet operational or directly threatening, but that, if permitted to mature, could be seen by the potential preemptor as susceptible to neutralization only at a higher and possibly unacceptable cost to itself” (pp. 525-29). Odhiambo et al., (2012) argues that this implies the use of force by a state against its

adversary so as to prevent an attack or to protect its domestic security (p. 3). Otherwise, the study noted, it would be disastrous, were the state to wait for its adversary to preempt.

According to its advocates, preemption is a strategy to protect a state if there is an “imminent threat” to its security. Mobilization of the adversary’s army, navy and air force has generally been defined as an imminent threat, for which, it is argued, preemptive force is permissible as an act of self-Defence.

Functionally, the main argument behind this perspective is that pursuing, capturing, killing, or disabling suspected terrorists before they can mount an attack can best counter terrorists and enhance domestic security in the pursuing state. It thus emphasizes proactive measures such as targeting of terrorists and their supporters with the aim of weakening the ability of the enemy to operate and subsequently reducing the occurrence of attacks (Sandler, 2005). President Ronald Reagan first used it in 1984 when he ordered the Director of Central Intelligence to develop “capabilities for the pre-emptive neutralization of anti-American terrorist groups which plan, support, or conduct hostile terrorist acts against U.S. citizens, interests, and property overseas.” This is the basis upon which coercive counter-terrorism policies are premised. Its core argument is informed by the idea that attacking identified terrorists will significantly reduce, or dismantle, or deter them or other terrorist attacks by establishing a reputation for being tough on terrorism. Coercive policy is intended to persuade an opponent to stop an action. It further contends that failing to respond aggressively or to concede to terrorist demands would earn a state a reputation as soft on terrorism and therefore encourage more terrorism (Stephenson, 2004).

Boaz Ganor (2005) in attempts to outline the goals mostly pursued by governments through this approach has distinguished three aims of counterterrorism policies: eliminating terrorism;

minimizing damage caused by terrorism and; preventing escalation of terrorism (p. 25). In order to achieve these goals in a successful and sustainable way, this approach emphasizes that military counter-terrorism should have defensive measures, to protect potential targets and seek to decrease the amount of damage caused by an attack (Sandler, 2005). This is its key strength. This perspective will certainly best help understand Kenya's intervention in Somalia and the repercussions thereafter. The strength of this theory compared to classical deterrence is that while deterrence both classical and rationalists focus on nuclear weapons and states as the only actors, preemptive neutralization explains deterrence in terms of a state versus a transnational actor such as terrorists. In addition, the theory provides the parameters against which its implementation can be evaluated. This forms the basis of this critical analysis we seek to carry out. Certainly, this is the premise upon which we intend to investigate the effect Kenya's military operation on the Al Shabaab has had on Kenya's domestic security.

The weakness of this approach perhaps is that pre-emptive neutralization like classical and rational deterrence where it draws may be disastrous especially when the capacity of the adversary is underestimated and is therefore prone to error of judgment. It assumes that the adversary (terrorists) is irrational and that their capacity is likely to reduce with the preemptive attack or preventive attack. In addition, they may not change their tactics, that they would be constrained, therefore contained.

Because preemptive neutralization manifests a set of proposals of actions (preemptive and preventive military intervention) for the statesman it demonstrates the capability for orderly arrangement and examination of data. These combined; elevate preemptive neutralization to the most preferred theory. The study therefore used it to: understand the basis and context of the

military operations; its effect on Kenya's domestic security and; interpret the demonstrated performance of the operation in light of the utility of military counterterrorism.

1.8. Methodology

This part outlines the explicit rules and procedures on which research was based and as well as the basis of evaluating the information obtained from primary and secondary data in order to arrive at (new) knowledge. The study was qualitative and therefore it relied on library research and qualitative interviews.

1.8.1. Research Design

Descriptive and interpretative design was used to obtain insights into the contribution of the military operation in Somalia to enhancement of domestic security in Kenya. Being qualitative primary data were collected to understand daily life and people's perceptions and meaning they give to their lives (Fouche & Delport, 2002, p. 79). Accordingly, the study used narratives, extract facts and draw examples on terror events and the resultant costs, Kenya's terror vulnerability and to obtain individual insights and perceptions of people in Kenya on their safety.

1.8.2. Sources of Data

Data was drawn from primary and secondary sources. Primary data were collected using in-depth-interviews. Key respondents suspected to have information on Kenya's military operation in Somalia and domestic security situation in Kenya were reached through purposive snowballing method. Secondary data were obtained from both primary and secondary documents. Primary documents included government statements and documents on security, hospital records, police records and documents obtained from non-governmental sources.

Secondary documents included scholarly books, journal articles, reports, theses, essays and news reports in the library and on the internet/websites regarding the military operation and the security situation in Kenya before, during and after the operation. These were both in print and electronic format.

1.8.3. Study Area

Primary data collection was carried out in various parts of Kenya that had witnessed a number of terror events before, during and after Kenya's military operation in Somalia. These included Nairobi, Mombasa, Mandera, Garissa, Wajir, Hulugho, Liboi, Gerille, Lamu, Malindi and the Dadaab Refugee Complex.

1.8.4. Sampling technique(s)

Purposive sampling was used to identify key strata of institutions and specifically, snowballing (chain sampling) method was used to select individuals who might have deeper insight into Kenya's military operation in Somalia and its domestic security. Once interviewed, the respondent was asked to name the next person who could have information on the operation and/or terrorism in Kenya. These included 5 staff in Ministry of Interior and National Coordination; 2 civilian staff at Police Headquarters and 5 senior police officers; 4 staff from Department of Immigration (1 Principal Immigration Officer and 3 Immigration Officers); 4 KDF soldiers who had participated in the operation (1 major and 3 senior privates), 5 staff from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2 from Africa & AU Division and 3 from Horn of Africa Division), 5 staff from Ministry of East African Affairs & Tourism; 5 staff from the Red Cross; 2 staff from Médecins Sans Frontières; 5 security officers from private security; 5 tourists (1 in Nairobi, 2 in Lamu and 2 in Mombasa), 5 Hospitality industry staff; 5 religious leaders (1 Catholic Priest, 1

Anglican Pastor and 3 Muslim clerics), 5 people in the transport sector (1 at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, Nairobi, 2 at Moi International Airport, Mombasa, 1 bus driver plying Garissa–Mandera route and 1 bus conductor in Nairobi), 2 researchers on security issues, 5 victims of terrorism and 5 members of the general public. The four KDF officers were reached through snowball sampling since it was difficult to find military officers who could easily participate in the interviews. In total, the study reached 69 key informants, a point at which data saturation occurred.

1.8.5. Data Collection

Data collection is the process of gathering and measuring information on variables of interest, in an established systematic fashion that enables one to answer stated research questions, test hypotheses, and evaluate outcomes. Data collection aims at capturing quality evidence to yield in rich data analysis and which allows the building of a convincing and credible answer to questions that have been posed.

1.8.5.1. Primary Data

Qualitative interview is appropriate for sensitive topics, such as terrorism. Informant interviews were conducted using in-depth interview schedules pretested in Eastleigh in Nairobi in January, 2014, to gather narratives from respondents. The interviews were based on prepared questions (*see appendices*). The interviews were conducted according to the position, knowledge, and professional and social background of the interviewee. This allowed thorough probing for clarification and detailed understanding of various individuals' perception of the domestic security situation in Kenya given Kenya's military operation in Somalia. The study posed specific analytical questions to the respondents, raised objective concerns based on issues of the

domestic security situation in Kenya given the frequency of terror events as well as the resultant costs. The study probed the responses given by the respondents, each case treated exclusively. The study allowed time for respondents who wished to make references to ascertain their arguments and for responses based on recorded facts in cases respondents wished to substantiate their points. The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed.

1.8.5.2. Secondary Data

The collection of secondary data began with the search for a study problem. Secondary data were obtained from police reports; government statements, briefs, reports, and Joint Communiqués and statements read in the press conferences convened by the president, cabinet secretary and principal secretary for interior affairs, the secretary to the cabinet and on the basis; hospital records; unofficial documents; books, theses, news reports, journal articles and institutional reports. Secondary data were obtained through a number of methods. For electronic data, key phrases bearing the two variables in the uniform resource locator (URL) were keyed in. Such included Kenya's military operation in Somalia; Kenya's domestic security situation (before, during and after the operation); terrorism in Kenya including attacks on police, civilians, buildings, churches, terrorist kidnappings and abductions, injuries and deaths, people's general feelings about security situations and police arrests of terror suspects. For library print (library) sources, various books by title, then by the table of contents and the index to look for key concepts, themes and publicists on terrorism and counterterrorism were identified

Various local and international newspapers were skimmed through the headlines and headings of reports inside. The sought to search for data in print and online media, journals, article/book reviews, various reports and individual theses/dissertations or essays/proposals. The condition

was that each must be rich in information regarding the military operation or the security situation in Kenya before, during and after the operation for example.

1.8.6. Data Analysis and Presentation

Various themes or discourses were identified and coded appropriately. Data was first organized into variables and categories. The study identified and analysed emerging categories and indicators on counter-terrorism and domestic security (Babbie, 2010). Thus, qualitative data, from both the secondary sources and qualitative interviews, were analysed using content analysis, which involved identifying recurring themes. The process involved going through the whole data collected, sentence by sentence, word by word, identifying recurring themes and coding them (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The study identified key themes and how they shaped the key variables.

Qualitative data were presented in textual descriptions and illustrations aided by verbatim quotations. However, some of the data were quantified to enhance the explanation on the frequency of terror attacks. The quantified data were presented in tables of frequencies.

The study identified key themes and how they shaped the key variables. The qualitative data were presented in textual descriptions and illustrations aided by verbatim quotations. However, some of the data were quantified to enhance the explanation on the frequency of terror attacks. The quantified data were presented in tables of frequencies.

In determining the frequency of terror events in Kenya since it launched the operation in Somalia, every single terror event was dealt with by categorizing them according to the type of attack, weapon used, the place it took place and the targets. In assessing the cost of terrorism

after the operation, the number of victims for each terror event both in terms of individuals who lost their lives and those who sustained injuries were identified. Further categories were created. For the deaths, injuries, and kidnappings, the number of civilians, police, KDF, government officers, and humanitarian/aid workers per terror event was analyzed. For destructions and disruptions, the study identified the property destroyed and events disrupted by terrorism in Kenya. This showed the nature and extent of destruction on both public and private property including places of work such as police stations, business premises, equipment and stock, government offices, government vehicles and machinery, public transport vehicles, places of worship, recreation and entertainment facilities, residential facilities, refugee camps, humanitarian assistance operation centres among others.

In addition, cases of terror kidnappings and hostage taking, the economic backlash in terms of national spending on the operation and economic shock particularly in tourism and hospitality sector were analyzed: the numbers in terms of annual earnings and arrivals.

To establish patterns, the study carried out open coding by classifying and labeling of concepts from interviews and discourses such as terror incidents (attacks, kidnappings, hostages); cost of terror (deaths, injuries and losses). Findings been presented in the form of frequency tables to aid interpretations and illustrations

In addition, the study did selective coding to determine the relationship between military operation and Kenya's domestic security. Relationships between the military operation and the domestic security in Kenya were drawn. To evaluate Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism after the operation, the analyzed various data pertaining to increasing possibility of terrorists targeting strategic infrastructure and equipment such as water and oil pipes and attacks on police stations.

In assessing Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism and exploring the perception of the people on their security since the operation was launched, axial coding was done

For qualitative interviews, common themes were identified using case-oriented analysis where several cases were examined to establish patterns. This helped to exclusively understand and examine the details of each case particularly in analyzing the feelings of each individual regarding their security. Distribution of key concepts such as attacks, insecurity, victims, kidnappings, deaths in themes and categories were established, mapped and tabulated, to enhance the qualitative explanations whether the operation enhanced Kenya's domestic security.

To determine whether the operation enhanced Kenya's domestic security, the examined processes and variations such as events of terrorist violence and consequences of terrorism on domestic security as well. These were based on of events and costs of those events recorded during and after the operation viewed against the level of the violence of terrorism in Kenya and Kenyans' perceptions on the state of security in Kenya and trend over time.

1.9. Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study investigated the effect of Kenya's military operation in Somalia on domestic security in Kenya. The study was carried out in Kenya only and data collection was limited to the parts of Kenya that had witnessed a number of terror events since the operation in Somalia was launched. Constraints of time and resources limited the study geographically. However, the study apportioned adequate amount of time for interviews in the generation of primary data. It was difficult to obtain written permission from particular institutions to grant entry and access to information; therefore, verbal permission was sought and was granted in most cases.

Classified information on Operation *Linda Nchi* and security in Kenya could not be accessed but the study obtained official government occasional security actions or statement made in open fora. The study also opted for related information from investigative journalists obtained in newspapers and apportioned adequate amount of time to ensure deep interviews. However, no copies of documents accessed by the study could be carried away. The burden of having to go through several materials to find information relevant to the study was borne with focused determination, and the data collected was sufficient for the desired outcome on the basis of the objectives of the study. As the effect, results or impact of Kenya's military operation in Somalia and the prevailing domestic security situation were all clearly visible and assessable, observation-based conclusions were not out of reach.

Thematically, the study was confined to the effect of counter-terrorism on domestic security. Specifically, it sought to determine the effect of Kenya's military operation in Somalia (Operation *Linda Nchi*) on Kenya's domestic security. In principle, matters of security are often considered secret and access to information is limited by security classification. Whereas data was collected from interviewees who have been linked to Kenya's military operation and the domestic security in Kenya, the scope and depth of information collected have been limited to unclassified information.

1.10. Ethical Considerations

Ethics are a set of moral principles that are suggested by an individual or group, are subsequently widely accepted, and offer rules and behavioural expectations about the most correct conduct towards respondents and relevant authorities. Therefore, permission to proceed with the study and to guarantee respect for human subject was obtained from Maseno University. Further,

ethical clearance was obtained from Maseno University Ethical Review Committee. Research participants were informed of the nature of the study and that participation in the study was completely voluntary. Informed consent was obtained from all participants and the respondents were assured of confidentiality. Respect for human privacy and dignity was maintained throughout the data collection and analysis process. Qualitative data collected in this study were individual's responses and were reported qualitatively. No information that could be used to identify certain individuals was sought.

1.11. Organization of the Study

The rest of the thesis is organized in chapters with sections. Chapter two analyses Kenya's domestic security since 1964. Chapter three theorizes and analyses Kenya's military operation in Somalia which is the independent variable. Chapter four presents the findings on the frequency on terrorism in Kenya since it launched Operation *Linda Nchi* in pursuit of Al Shabaab in Somalia. Chapter five presents the findings on the cost of terrorism in Kenya since it launched Operation *Linda Nchi* in pursuit of Al Shabaab in Somalia. Chapter six discusses Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism since it launched Operation *Linda Nchi* in pursuit of Al Shabaab in Somalia. Chapter seven outlines summary of key findings, the conclusion and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

KENYA'S DOMESTIC SECURITY FROM INDEPENDENCE TO OCTOBER 2011

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter the study provides conceptual and operational definitions of domestic security. It discusses the various facets of domestic security, with particular interest on terrorism. It mainly discusses Kenya's domestic security from a historical perspective outlining key features of Kenya's domestic security: the security issues, actors, interests and the institutions that form the security architecture. It presents the main facets of Kenya's domestic security from independence and post-independence period to the present, explaining their sources and how they have influenced Kenya's domestic security. To illustrate the manifestation of terrorism in Kenya and how it affected Kenya's domestic security before Operation *Linda Nchi* was launched, the study presents analyses of the security situation in Kenya in light of terror attacks identifying the terror events that have characterized Kenya's domestic security particularly since independence. This provides a baseline for the study. Lastly, in this chapter the study discusses the emergence of Al Shabaab terror activities in Kenya informing its military operation in Somalia.

2.1.1. Concept Domestic Security

Broadly speaking, security can be defined as freedom from fear (of violence and conflict) and freedom from want (from hunger and deprivation) (KNCHR, 2014). Buzan (1991) defines security as follows:

Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of

existence. Quite where this range of concerns ceases to merit the urgency of the ‘security’ label (which identifies threats as significant enough to warrant emergency action and exceptional measures including the use of force) and becomes part of everyday uncertainties of life is one of the difficulties of the concept. (Buzan, 1991, pp. 432-433).

Although there is no universally accepted definition of domestic security even when it is referred to differently as ‘homeland security’ (in the United States of America) (Reese, 2013, p. 1) and as ‘internal security’ (in the European Union) and Kenya, Bellavita (2008) has attempted seven definitions of domestic security. From the various definitions, the study concluded that concept ‘domestic security’ denotes freedom from implied or real threat, the state and quality of being protected or being safe from harm and the freedom from fear or anxiety within a sovereign state. It included the precautions taken by the government to safeguard its people from harm or its manifestations. It is depicted by the general safety within a state implying the state of law and order prevailing within a nation (Kahan, 2013, p. 1).

In the post-Cold War era, the concept of Security has become much more multifaceted and complex (Stone, 2009). Of Buzan’s facets of security, the more prominent one are military threats which can affect all components of the state (Buzan, 1991). It can put into question the very basic duty of a state to be able to protect its citizens as well as have an adverse effect on the “layers of social and individual interest”. The level and objectives of military threat can take on different levels of importance (Stone, 2009). Therefore, domestic security has many facets and challenges (Reese, 2013; Bellavita, 2008). The facets vary from country to country (Reese, 2013; Davis, 2010).

The concern of domestic security is internal (Kahan, 2013). In the context of domestic security, the goal of security entails: protecting the domestic population and critical infrastructure against threats and aggression (Reese, 2013); prevention and preparation for incidents likely to threaten the safety and security of citizens and their property; prevention and handling of crime (theft, banditry, robbery, arson, treason, terrorism, etc. in Kenya); preventing and mitigating any social trend or threat that can disrupt the stability of the country. It entails local efforts aimed at preventing and preparing for incidents that can threaten the safety and security of citizens within the country.

2.2. Historical Analysis of Kenya's Domestic Security since Independence

In this section, the study traces the major threats to Kenya's domestic security from independence during the various regimes to date. It focuses on issues and events which impacted Kenya's domestic security, how the government responded to them and the outcomes.

In principle, since independence, the government of Kenya has been preoccupied with the protection of its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability and prosperity, and other national interests against internal and external threats to Kenya's territorial integrity and sovereignty (Adar, 1994, pp. 75–76). This quest is still expressed in Article 228 (1) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.

The security situation in Kenya has taken many faces since independence (1963). At independence, internal security threats included ethnic tensions, political rivalry, poverty, ignorance and disease, labor unrest, and disquiet in the military (Ogola, 2014, p. 54). Much of serious threats to the traditional security were foreign diverse potential threats. First, Kenya had to identify its national interests and develop mechanisms of protecting these interests from

external threats (Ogola, 2014, p. 55). Therefore the major preoccupation of states was the protection of its sovereignty (Orwa, 1990, p. 222).

In the 1970s, ethnic political rivalry majorly determined Kenya's domestic security (Ogola, 2014, p. 56). The country became highly polarized such that the ethnic polarization remained largely latent yet the government did not put in place any attempts or strategy to address ethnicity as a domestic security problem (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995). However, the sudden death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 eased ethnic tensions and possible ethnic violence thus averting potential security threat of clashes for control of state was averted by chance (Ogola, 2014).

Alongside ethnic tension, internal instability culminating in the 1982 attempted coup against president Moi and its continuity thereafter called for outright abuse of power by the Moi Administration, targeting and killing or detaining without trial under inhumane conditions political disloyally, banning of political outfits that were perceived to be anti-Moi and generally the use of fear to impose obedience (Oyugi, 1994). Perennial conflict among the pastoral communities in the northern Kenya still remains a domestic security challenge. It manifests in the form of cattle raids and banditry. This culminates in widespread displacement of several families and loss of lives (Ogola, 2014).

The other major threat to national security in Kenya since independence and more so in the 1960s and 1970s and to a certain extent 1980s, was the Somalia irredentism (Orwa, 1990). Following the overthrow of General Siad Barre in 1991, this changed changing the nature of security in Kenya bringing in security challenges due to massive influx of Somalia refugees. Until present, these new security issues have included piracy in the Kenyan coastline, constant

incursions by bandits and kidnappers from Somalia who have been hijacking and killing tourists, capturing government officials.

Although conceived in the late 1980s, a Kikuyu-dominated sect called *Mungiki*, modeled along the pre-independence anti-colonialism *Mau Mau*, became a major security issue in Kenya despite its major operation being confined to Nairobi City (BBC, 2008). It threatened Kenya's security more so from 2002 when it is alleged its members killed at least 50 public service vehicle owners making the government to ban it. In 2007, it killed more than 30 people were killed in Nairobi during a three-day police crackdown on them and (Allen, 2012, pp. 1-7). In 2008 when it participated in the killing of several Luos following the ethnic violence that erupted following the 2007 disputed presidential elections results (Childress, 2008).

The emergence and thence the proliferation of terrorism as a global threat to peace and security of states collectively and individually has not exempted Kenya. Terrorism has been elevated into the foremost threat to global security (Africa Policy Brief, 2007). The next section presents analyses on terrorism in Kenya from independence to the time Kenya launched military operation against the Al Shabaab terrorist group operating from Somalia.

2.2.1. Emergence of Terrorism in Kenya

Since 1975, terrorism has become one of the main facets of Kenya's domestic security. In fact, terrorism has increasingly become a great threat to the safety and security of peoples in Kenya (Menkhaus, 2012, Miyandazi, 2012). Although terrorism featured among security issues in Kenya in 1975 and in 1980, today it is one of the dominant, if not the most significant security issue in Kenya, and it has greatly threatened Kenya's domestic security in the recent past and in the present times.

According to KNCHR Occasional Report (2014), since 2010, there “has been an increase in the incidence, gravity and intensity of insecurity including persistent terror attacks, inter-community conflicts and violence targeting law enforcement officers as well as a big number of extra-judicial executions” in the country. This has seen both civilians and law enforcement officers lose their lives, get injured and a lot of property worth billions of shillings were destroyed following terror attacks (KNCHR, Occasional Report, 2014). This “surpasses the psychological watershed mark of the 1133 Kenyans who died during the country’s worst internal conflict following the 2007-08 post-election violence”. From the terror events, various essential activities were disrupted including the provision of essential services in the education and health sectors following cases of persistent insecurity, with the deaths of teachers and medical staff reported in some of these areas (p. 4).

By 16th October 2011, 9 terror attacks Kenya had experienced in Kenya. Although these first four terror attacks having occurred in Kenya affected the country’s security, it must be underlined that they were terror attacks targeting the United States of America and Israel. The first terrorist attack in independent Kenya recorded in the Global Terrorism Database took place in February, March, and April of 1975 and is referred to as the 1975 Nairobi Bombings (NCTC, 2015; START, Global Terrorism Database, 2013; Wallis 2000). It claimed lives of 30 civilian people and injured more than 100 (Mwangi, 2013).

The second terror event was the 1980 New Year’s Eve Norfolk Hotel Bombing, five years later. The terror bomb explosion flattened the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi, killing 20 people and injuring 80 others (NCTC, 2015; Wallis, 2000). An Arab group, PLO in particular, claimed responsibility citing their discontent with Kenya supporting Israeli troops during the raid on Entebbe Airport in

Uganda four years earlier (in 1976). Kenyan authorities with assistance from international security agencies arrested the 34-year-old Qaddura Mohammed Abdel Al Hamid of Morocco, the prime suspect within hours. The culprit had checked into the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi in the last week of 1980 (NCTC, 2015; Maumo, 2009, p. 81).

The third terror attack in Kenya was the August 7, 1998 Bomb Blast 18 years later though, but its magnitude and aftermath were great and severe (NCTC, 2015; START, Global Terrorism Database, p. 1; Maumo, 2009, p. 81; Kagwanja, 2007, p. 3). This terror attack was executed by the Nairobi Embassy Bombing Cell, allied to the Al Qaeda (Muchangi and Koross, 2013). This event killed more than 291 civilian people, including 247 civilian Kenyans, 12 Americans, and 32 non-American Embassy staffs and one of the terrorists, and wounded more than 5,000 others (Wallis, 2000). The explosion damaged the embassy building and collapsed the neighbouring Ufundi Building. A packed commuter bus was burned (Wallis, 2000, p. 14).

The fourth significant terror event that interfered with the safety and security of the peoples and property in Kenya was the terror bombing of the Israeli-owned Airliner and the Paradise Hotel at Kikambala on 28th November, 2002, for which Al Qaeda claimed responsibility (Maumo, 2009, p. 85; Kagwanja, 2007, p. 3). Many western countries suspended travels to Kenya mainly, Britain (Theuri, 2013). A total of 10 Kenyans died, 9 of them being employees of the hotel. Of the 140 tourists, 13 including 2 children were killed and 80 were injured. The police hunted down a Mr. Bajnaf Mselem Swaleh Mahdi Khamisi, who they believed might lead them to Fazul, the main suspect (Theuri, 2013).

The fifth notable terror event was the 8.00 am City Gate Restaurant attack next to Hotel Ambassadeur, on June 11, 2007. It killed 2 people including a suspect (Allen, 2012, p.1-8). This

suicide attack targeted Kenyans and foreigners and destroyed the business premises, public entertainment and peace of revelers. The sixth terror event marked Kenya's domestic security was the Simmers Restaurant Attack along Kenyatta Avenue in September 2009. This was a grenade attack (Muchangi and Koross, 2013). It left 1 person dead, disrupted business and entertainment and the premises and left insecure revelers and neighbours (ibid).

From 2010, terrorism in the county began to intensify (KNCHR, Occasional Report, 2014, p. 9). In June 2010, there was an attack in Nairobi's Uhuru Park that police blamed on followers of Al Shabaab. According to Kenya Police Crime Report, 2011, three grenades exploded at a pre-constitutional referendum church-led rally in Uhuru Park killing 6 people and 30 injured (NCTC, 2015). On December 4, 2010, 3 policemen including 2 traffic police officers and an AP were killed and 39 people injured in separate grenade attacks in Nairobi. A fortnight later, one person was killed, 26 were injured after a grenade exploded at Kampala Coach Bus terminus, River Road (Allen, 2012, p. 1-8).

Following rising terrorism in the country, the government reshuffled senior police officers particularly in North Eastern Kenya-the most affected and civil servants coordinating Government at regional and local level hitherto called provincial administrators. This was aimed to result in significant deterrence or reduction in terrorism in the areas mainly targeted by the Al Shabaab (Menkhaus, 2012, pp. 2-8). Despite the efforts put by the Government of Kenya to contain terror activities in the country, Al Shabaab activities in the country became more and more conspicuously provocative. In the following section, the study describes conspicuous Al Shabaab terror activities in Kenya and how they affected the country's internal security until the time Kenya executed 'hot pursuit' against the terrorists in Somalia.

2.2.2. Overt Al Shabaab Terror Activities in Kenya before Operation *Linda Nchi*

The Al Shabaab remained the main transnational terrorist group that threatened Kenya's domestic security (START, Global Terrorism Database, p. 2). The intensification of Al Shabaab terror activities in Kenya became overt mainly in 2011 (Menkhaus, 2012, p. 5; Miyandazi, 2012, p. 6). The terror gang was responsible for 65% of all terror events which had occurred in Kenya between 2008 and 2012 (START, Global Terrorism Database, p. 3). Most of these events were witnessed in the North Eastern Region of Kenya, along the Kenyan Coast Region and in Eastleigh, a suburb of Nairobi (Menkhaus, 2012; Gentleman, 2012). Both parts of Kenya are inhabited mostly by people of the Somali descent. Eastleigh in Nairobi is referred to as "little Mogadishu". For a long time the two places have proven difficult to effectively be controlled by Kenyan authorities (Menkhaus, 2012, p. 2).

Specifically, the Somali-inhabited Eastleigh Estate in Nairobi had been serving as Al Shabaab recruitment and fund-raising base and planning point of terror events in Kenya and even elsewhere (Menkhaus, 2012, p. 5). In reaction to Al Shabaab activities in the country, in 2010 Kenya's approach became more assertive and interventionist late that year Kenya allowed Ethiopian military incursion against Al Shabaab through Kenyan territory into the border town of Bulo Hawa (Ibid, p. 3). However, Menkhaus (2012) observes that the operation instead led to subsequent instability and an increase in Al Shabaab violence in northern Kenya through into 2011. Despite these developments, the public operated freely in shopping malls, recreation and entertainment places including restaurant or public buildings without fear or apprehension (p. 4).

By October 2011, the transnational terrorist organization had conducted some few nefarious terror activities in the country, including among major ones, a proliferation of a spate of cross-

border kidnapping of two Spanish women who were working for Médecins sans Frontières (doctors without borders) at the Dadaab refugee camp complex in the northern part of Kenya (Menkhaus, 2012, p. 3). It can however be argued that the main intention of the Al Shabaab in carrying out the kidnappings was to obtain ransom to finance themselves or food to eat as they carried out their activity in Somalia (Odhiambo et al., 2012, p. 4).

However, the fact remains that terror activities greatly undermine domestic security and it is very unique to Kenya given its unique nature which greatly differs from the traditional security issues particularly in terms of its agenda, actors and targets. In this realm, the Kenya population and foreigners legally in the country, critical infrastructure both public and private, ought to be protected by the security agencies of the state such as the police. Terrorists can sabotage the utility of critical infrastructure and installations and derail the domestic security (Reese, 2013).

How did the operation affect terrorism in Kenya?

2.3. Summary

The security situation in Kenya has been characterised by various forms of insecurity. Some issues of insecurity are spontaneous, like ethnic clashes and terrorism, while others are perennial. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, major security issues included ethnic tensions, political rivalry, poverty, ignorance and disease, labor unrest, and disquiet in the military. In the 1990s, threats to territorial integrity, due to Somalia irredentism and perennial conflict due to cattle rustling and banditry in northern parts of Kenya, were major manifestations of insecurity in the country. The 1970, 1980s and 1990s each only recorded at most two terror attacks while from 2002 to 2011 when Kenya launched its military operation in Somalia, five terror events were recorded, indicating the changing security situation in Kenya.

The increasing trend of terrorism in the country has made it a major facet of the country's domestic security. Much as the police, NIS and civil servants coordinating Government at regional/county levels have been the key actors in domestic security issues in the country, there has been intensification of overt Al Shabaab activities in Kenya, which has derailed the effectiveness of the law enforcers (anti-terrorists).

The security situation in the country deteriorated as time went by. As a way of enhancing its domestic security, the government of Kenya opted to stop terrorists in Somalia (Al Shabaab) from crossing over to Kenya by launching a military operation dubbed Operation *Linda Nchi*.

The next chapter discusses Kenya's military operation in Somalia.

CHAPTER THREE

KENYA'S MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST AL SHABAAB IN SOMALIA

3.1. Introduction

From the realist perspective, a subset of which pre-emptive neutralization is, the state has inherent responsibility to protect itself, especially its citizens, from any form of threat to their existence, be this threat real or imagined, internal or external (Morgenthau, 1978; Waltz, 1959). Conventionally, external threats come from other states (Ogola, 2014; Morgenthau, 1978; Waltz, 1959). However, the post-cold war epoch saw internal wars rise and transnational terrorism emerge as a form of serious external threat to internal security of the state (Brimmer et al., 2008; 2006; Sanico and Kakinaka, 2007).

Given the “far-reaching lethality” of transnational terrorism on the domestic security, exemplified by the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attack in the United States, the United Nations Security Council, in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter, resolved to declare terrorism a global threat (Oudraat, 2004) and invoked global war against it (UNSC Res. 1373/2001). This legitimised the use of military operation hitherto carried out “illegitimately” by the United States in Afghanistan, Sudan and Egypt against the Al Qaida following the 1998 US Embassy Bombings in East Africa, and in Pakistan against the Taliban.

It is premised on this debate that this chapter analyses the military operation launched by Kenya against the Al Shabaab in Somalia. In particular, the chapter provides a detailed but concise analysis and description of Kenya's Operation *Linda Nchi*, major events of the operation with a view to enhancing analysis of its effect on terrorism in Kenya, which comes in chapter four. The next section presents the analytical description of the operation.

3.2. The Operation *Linda Nchi* Against the Al Shabaab in Somalia

A number of studies have found that carrying out military operations targeting terrorists and their supporters abroad can end or significantly weaken their ability to operate and therefore bolster the domestic security of the state. At the same time, a number of studies have found that military operation on terrorists is blunt and ineffective and may simply invite more terrorism within the state thus deteriorate domestic security.

The two decades-long lack of a substantive central government in Somalia had provided haven for Al Shabaab, posing potential threat to the security in the neighbouring countries. Kenya had been keen on creating a buffer zone between the Al Shabaab and Kenya using *Jubaland* (Miyandazi, 2012, p. 4). However, with increased overt Al Shabaab terror activities in Kenya despite several efforts to use anti-terror measures, including arrests and prosecution, Kenya launched the ‘Operation *Linda Nchi*’ (Protect the Nation) against the Al Shabaab, who were operating from Somalia, on October 16, 2011 (Odhiambo et al., 2012, pp. 2-8).

Kenya’s military operation was executed on the basis that the state still remained the most important guarantor of its interior security particularly military security (Buzan, Waeber, and de Wilde, 1998). The general argument however, is that to maintain internal order and guarantee the safety and security of its populations and their property in emerging major security threat, a state needs to eliminate if possible, all enemies of the state whether locally or from outside (Lipschutz 1995). This is what Kenya sought through its military operation in Somalia (Odhiambo et al., 2012; Miyandazi, 2012; Jolaade, 2012).

From the literature, it is not officially documented by the government but the main goal of the operation was to destroy the Al Shabaab and their affiliations in Somalia, clearing Kenya-

Somalia borders of Al Shabaab and creating a buffer zone to defend Kenya (Mbugua, 2015; Miyandazi, 2012; Menkhaus, 2012; Odhiambo et al., 2012; Throupe, 2012). The long-term goal of the operation was to eradicate Al Shabaab from Somalia.

Kenya's counter-terrorism was proper and within the right time, and there was a good sign that Al Shabaab was finally coming to an end (Interview with a major-general, Kenya Defence Forces). This would enhance Kenya's domestic security against terrorism (Odhiambo et al., 2012).

Although some people have contended that the military operation was hastily approved by just but a section of Kibaki's grand coalition government and regardless of sufficient consideration of the consequences at home, Kenya's military operation against the Al Shabaab in Somalia gained wide support from the region (Interview with political officer on the Kenya-Somalia Relations Desk, at the Africa & AU Division and another one at the Horn of Africa Division both at the State Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade-Republic of Kenya). Regional leaders supported Kenya's decision to employ military means against the Al Shabaab in Somalia. Such included Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn (Mbugua, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2012).

While Kenya executed military operation against the Al Shabaab in Somalia as a way of bolstering her domestic security, past studies reported unanticipated effect of military operation as a way of combating terrorism. From among the literature reviewed on counter-terrorism, Miller (2007), for example, concluded that military operation does not resolve an ongoing terrorism problem, and may be ineffective in reducing the level of terrorism. Sanico & Kakinaka (2002) observed that it perpetuates the cycle of violence instead of decreasing or terminating it.

Dotani (2011) studied US operation on the Taliban and concluded that it promoted the culture of terrorism in Pakistan as Malvesti (2002) concluded that military option is a blunt, ineffective instrument that creates a cycle of vengeance. The study describes major events and the outcomes of the operation in the next sub-chapter.

3.2.1. Events of Kenya's Military Operation in Somalia

From the outset this study underscores that the military operation in Somalia was not a conventional war. The Al Shabaab was not a clearly identified nemesis. They could not be easily identified from among the civilian populations (Odhiambo et al., 2012, p. 1). One KDF staff interviewed by the study argued:

It can be a big lie to claim that KDF had managed to dismantle or significantly reduce the capacity of the Al Shabaab, the transnational terror group itself undefined, and there it would be wrong to claim victory over them. It was not as easy as it might have been portrayed because identifying the so-called Al Shabaab was a problem given that they could easily camouflage as civilians...

When Kenya launched the Operation *Linda Nchi*, it needed to acknowledge the repercussions since previous attempts by the US, Pakistan, and Ethiopia barely had positive effects. Besides, the KDF troops feared fighting transnational terrorists who were very porous, sly and non-state therefore an elusive army-like. They were familiar with the terrain and topography, language, food, religion, clan-based conflict, war and piracy economy and hardship and above all, used to war, which defined their daily lives (Ichani, 2014, p. 18). Nonetheless, Kenya Defense Forces troops did not throw in the towel.

By the time Kenya began its hot-pursuit of the Al Shabaab, the terrorists were operating mainly in southern and central Somalia, particularly in Afmadou, Baidoa, Kismayo and Bulo Hawa. It had demonstrated capacity to strike Kenya from the milieu (Laibuta, 2009; Menkhaus et al., 2009; Menkhaus, 2012).

The Al Shabaab posed great threats to Kenya, the US and the West in general (Laibuta, 2009; Menkhaus, 2012). There were numerous reports of foreign jihadists going to Somalia to help Al Shabab and it had formed links with Al Qaeda (Menkhaus, 2012). The Al Shabaab had been banned as a terrorist group by both the US and the UK and is believed to have between 7,000 and 9,000 fighters. The Al Shabaab had imposed a strict version of Sharia law in areas under its control in Somalia including stoning to death women accused of adultery and amputating the hands of thieves (Garstein-Rose, 2009).

The operation involved the use of truckloads of soldiers, helicopters, and warplanes according to a senior military officer in KDF, who also added that the first troops had two Kenyan battalions of 800 men each. The first military activity by the KDF forces in Somalia was the taking control of the Qoqani Town in Somalia. The Kenya Air Force bombarded Al-Shabaab positions in the area. They killed hundreds of the Al Shabaab and destroyed their weaponry (Ichani, 2014).

Despite its strong-willed pursuit of the terrorists, KDF was confronted by a number of challenges among them, fighting an elusive warfare. The Al-Shabaab gained advantage of KDF's unfamiliarity with the battlefield resulting in asymmetric warfare. They adopted guerilla tactics. They disappeared into the unknown as a bait for the KDF mechanized infantry to move deeper into its heartland where they had strategically mixed freely with the civilian population among whom they won hearts and minds of willing youth to fight in their favour. In reaction, Kenya

Defense Forces became adaptive and resorted to asymmetric warfare and acquired more weapons to counter the terrorists.

Kenyan troops advanced toward Afmadow in southern Somalia in an effort to seize Kismayo from Al Shabaab (BBC, 2011). However, the Al-Shabaab had confiscated trucks to bring fresh troops to Afmadow and started building an entrenchment system. Kenyan forces bombed a key Al Shabaab operation and support base in Kismayo (*Interview with a colonel in the KDF*). Towards the end of October 2011, the terrorists ambushed a Kenyan forces convoy between the towns of Tabda and Bilis Qoqani in Southern Somalia. The very first direct confrontation between the belligerents lasted 30 minutes, 10 terrorists were killed as 2 soldiers were injured (Ichani, 2014, pp 41-9).

To challenge the KDF, Al Shabaab resorted to the use of Improvised Explosives Device (IED) (Ichani, 2014). This worried the Kenyan troops at the beginning of the operation. In its further retaliatory attempts, the Al Shabaab set up a car bomb, which exploded in Mogadishu while very senior Government officials from Kenya were on a state visit in Somalia (Migue, 2014). The Al-Shabaab began conscripting residents to help defend the entrenched Kismayo. While trying to refuel at sea, the Kenya Navy sank an Al Shabaab-claimed skiff carrying fuel, killing 18 militants (*Interview with a major in the KDF at Lanet Barracks, 20th June, 2014*).

About 10 days on, Al Shabaab fighters ambushed a Kenyan convoy in between the towns of Tabda and Bills Qoqani. The Al Shabaab killed 30 Kenyan troops, captured 4 and, destroyed 6 Kenyan military trucks in the day and night encounter. One full month after the operation, reported that Kenyan forces attacked an Al Shabaab base in Busar, and killed 12 Al Shabaab militants. Kenyan forces destroyed an Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda training facility in Hola Wajeer,

Badhadhe District as well. In reaction, in between Tabto and Doblely KDF convoy was ambushed by the Al Shabaab killing 1 soldier leaving many injured. Despite the losses, the Kenyan forces neutralized 10 Al Shabaab militants (Ichani, 2014, pp. 41-6).

In early 2012, KDF launched airstrikes on suspected Al Shabaab fighters, killing 60 of them and injuring 50 others. By March 2012, KDF indicated that Operation *Linda Nchi* was about to end and that Kenyan troops in Somalia were set to re-hat under the African Union's general command (Miyandazi, 2012). By the end of that month, Kenyan forces were already acting as AMISOM's southern contingent, and had captured Afmadow from Al Shabaab, granting access to many different parts of the country (Kamau, 2013). According to Ichani (2014), the operation was successful.

According to the Kenya-AU Relations File at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Kenya, in June, 2012, the Republic of Kenya entered an agreement with the aim of amalgamating KDF with the AU-AMISOM. In effect, the Kenyan Defence Forces were officially integrated into AMISOM on 20th June 2012 (Kimutahi, 2012). In defense of the operation, President Uhuru Kenyatta and chief national security heads and other national leaders maintained that Kenya's military operation in Somalia was noble and that Kenya would continue to wage its counterterrorism campaign against the Al Shabaab, its networks and any other terrorists.

It is estimated that the first five months of the operation cost about Ksh.18, 000,000,000.00 (\$180 million). By August 2012 KDF, long after they had been re-hatted into AMISOM, managed to edge closer to Kismayo. This reduced Al Shabaab's financial capacity, and therefore their war capacity, since they could not control the trade at the port effectively. Thus they lost about Ksh 25,000,000,000.00 (\$25 million) revenue per annum. This also reduced illegal

importation of sugar, cement, and some manufactured goods into Kenya via Kismayo. Al-Shabaab as well lost a good share of charcoal rent and taxes from lorries transporting it. It was therefore hoped that following the seizure of the port, the Al Shabaab now stood destroyed as they could not sustain control in the rural areas of Southern Somalia Anderson and McKnight, 2014, p. 11).

However, having retreated from Kismayo, the transnational terrorist coalesced at strategic points throughout Jubaland and the Shebelle Valley and despite being lean in numbers, they effectively backgrounded KDF under AMISOM (although operating almost completely independently) within Kismayo. They turned to the public for social and economic support through their “liberation campaigns”. This motivated them, such that their attacks on KDF and populations in southern Somalia from October to December 2012 increased to 178, including 70 combat engagements, 39 grenade attacks and 43 assassinations of Somalis “believed to be assisting the invaders or obstructing Al-Shabaab” (Anderson and McKnight, 2014, pp. 11-18). By the end of March 2013, this increased to 192 attacks including 78 combat engagements, 26 grenade attacks, 52 assassinations and others. The Al-Shabaab recaptured several towns. Its 5,000-strong militia remained compact and it had stockpiled weapons ready for retaliations. In short, they had increased their capacity once more, as that of the international forces had reduced in intensity (ibid).

Despite refusal and warning by the UN and the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu that reopening the port would allow infiltration of charcoal business by Al Shabaab, KDF, its ally Ahmed Madobe and his Ras Kamboni Brigade unilaterally reopened thus allowing Al Shabaab to maintain its strongholds in southern Somalia, and their fighting force.

Following the capture of Kismayo, AMISOM decided not to increase its capacity further. Kenya supported this but it strengthened Al-Shabaab instead. It regrouped and reorganized such that by mid-2013, it Al-Shabaab executed a chain of attacks in areas controlled by AMISOM mainly in Mogadishu on 14 April 2013, 19 June 2013 and 17 July 2013. This prompted the UN Security Council Resolution 2124 that expanded AMISOM with Ethiopia joining it and increased support for the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) (UN Monitoring Group, 2013, p. 16).

The irony was that the security situation that characterized the period of the operation indicated an otherwise outcome of the counterterrorism strategy. Kenya witnessed the highest number of individuals killed, injured and traumatized and, millions worth of property was lost in a single terror event: the Westgate Terror Attack in 2013 just about three months after the re-hatting of KDF into AMISOM “after successfully dealing with the Al Shabaab”; the time which KDF independently and under the AMISOM was believed to be doing well in the battle against the Al Shabaab (Oeri, 2014). Did it mean that the operation failed or that the retaliatory attacks indicated the short-term increase in terrorism? These questions were not adequately answered by the available literature reviewed.

3.3. Summary

The Al Shabaab had infiltrated the Somali-inhabited northeastern region of Kenya, making it insecure and unstable, indicating the country’s increased vulnerability to terrorism, with Al Shabaab violence throughout 2011 (Menkhaus, 2012, p. 3). Eastleigh in Nairobi had also largely become uncontrollable for the Kenyan authorities; therefore, it served as Al Shabaab recruitment and fund-raising centre (Miyandanzi, 2012). The military operation followed increased overt Al Shabaab terror activities in the region extending into Kenya, and this justified its action.

Whereas most studies depict Kenya's military operation in Somalia as successful, most of the works proclaiming KDF success do not show commensurability between their argument and the reality of terrorism in the country, both during and after the operation. There is every reason to argue that the studies might not give a true outcome of the operation, warranting the determination of how the operation affected internal security in Kenya.

In the next chapter, the study analyses and describes terrorism in Kenya since the country launched the military operation in Somalia (Operation *Linda Nchi*). It does this by determining the frequency of terror attacks in Kenya since it launched military operation in Somalia.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE FREQUENCY OF TERRORISM IN KENYA SINCE OCTOBER 16 2011

4.1. Introduction

By 16th October 2011, 9 terror attacks had been experienced in Kenya. The first four of these did not directly target Kenya but the United States of America and Israel, although the fact remains that they occurred in Kenya, affecting negatively the country's security. Objectively, Kenya's military operation in Somalia was aimed at bolstering Kenya's domestic security by dismantling the Al Shabaab or significantly reducing their capacity to carry out terror activities in Kenya (Odhiambo et al., 2012, pp. 1-3). This aimed at denying the terrorists opportunity to penetrate into the country and execute terrorism in whatever form, be it use of lethal means such as weapons or abduction and kidnapping, taking hostages et cetera. It would also act as deterrence to any other terrorists who would attempt actions against Kenya (Ichani, 2014, p. 41).

It is against this background that the study determined the frequency of terrorism. In this chapter, findings on the frequency of terror events in Kenya are discussed.

In the next section, the distribution of terror events that occurred in Kenya from 16th October, 2011 to the mid-2015 is presented.

4.2. The Frequency of Terror Attacks in Kenya from 16th October, 2011 to Mid-2015

There has been increase in the incidence, gravity and intensity of insecurity since 2010 (KNCHR Occasional Report, 2014, p. 4). However, the report does not specifically attribute this to terrorism. Against this background, Kenya's military operation against the Al Shabaab was expected to result in reduction of terror events in the country, even to zero, thus enhancing her

domestic security. In order to test the assumption, the study determined the number of terror attacks that occurred in Kenya since the operation was launched.

The data indicate that as the operation was going on in Somalia, a number of terror events occurred in Kenya, which were declared by the police as having been executed by the Al Shabaab or were claimed by the Al Shabaab itself. From descriptive analysis, the study shows that by end of June 2015, a total of 126 terror events had been recorded in Kenya. Table 4.1 shows the frequency distribution of the events by year from October 16, 2011 to June 30, 2015.

Table 4.1

Frequency of Terror Events in Kenya by Year

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of terror Events</u>
2011 (from 16 th October)	23
2012	53
2013	12
2014	20
2015 (until 30 th June)	18
<u>Total</u>	<u>126</u>

Note. From study data

The short period between the time the operation was launched and the end of the year 2011 registered 23 terror attacks, which is a very high frequency. There were 53 terror attacks that characterised Kenya's domestic security in 2012. This was more than double the number of terror attacks in 2011.

The 53 terror attacks that occurred in 2012, despite KDF having been hailed for a successful operation warranting its integration into AMISOM, can be attributed to the Al Shabaab affiliation to the Al Qaeda that year. It received training and information on combat tactics and larger funding from the well-financed terrorist group. Al Shabaab's sniper activity against AMISOM, into which KDF was re-hatted, also increased. Generally, its attacks became more coordinated and sophisticated, with the civilians and the police, military and immigration becoming its key targets (Okwir, 2015, p. 85).

While the frequency of terror events in Kenya reduced to 12 in 2013, the Al Shabaab was intensifying its fight against the KDF under AMISOM and AMISOM in general, in Somalia. By the end of March 2013, its attacks in Somalia against AMISOM had increased to 192, including combat engagements, grenade attacks and assassinations (Okwir, 2015, p. 85). It recaptured several towns as its 5,000-strong militia remained compact. It had stockpiled weapons, ready for retaliations (Anderson & McKnight, 2014). They must have been re-strategizing as well on how to attack Kenya more effectively and efficiently.

The September 2013 Westgate Mall terror siege, in which the Al Shabaab attacked and took control of the up-market centre for some four days, had a tremendous effect on Kenya's security, arguably worse than any other terror event in Kenya before it. They took control of an easily-defendable place, taking hostages so as to buy time and be able to stage a propaganda coup. The attack took the form of mass murder, shootings, hostage crisis, and siege, and lasted four good days. Both grenades and AK47 arms were used (Anderson & McKnight, 2014). Also, the study shows an increasing trend in the frequency of terror attacks in 2014. The Al Shabaab's efforts against the KDF, its re-capturing of more ports as well as its sustained collaboration with the Al

Qaeda, were a mark of success for its cause. By end of June 2015, 18 cases were already observed, an indication of an increasing pattern that year as well.

The study observed that there was greater increase in the frequency of terror events in Kenya between 16th October, 2011 and 30th June, 2015 than between 1975 and 16th October, 2011. This was from 9 terror attacks occurring at wider intervals in a period of 36 years, to 126 terror attacks in four years at close intervals, nearly 2 terror attacks occurring concurrently.

4.2.1. Frequency of Terror Events in Various Parts of the Country

The terror events occurred in different parts of the country: Dadaab, Garissa, Lamu Town, Mandera, Mombasa, Nairobi and Wajir. Garissa recorded 32, the highest number of terror attacks since 16th October 2011, followed by Nairobi, at 25 terror attacks. Table 4.2 illustrates the frequency distribution of terror attacks in Kenya by place or location.

Table 4.2

Frequency of Terror Events in Various Parts of Kenya since 16th October 2011

<u>Part of Kenya</u>	<u>Number of Terror Events</u>
Dadaab	15
Garissa	32
Lamu	8
Mandera	24
Mombasa	10
Nairobi	25
Wajir	12
Total	126

Note. From study data

Before the operation was launched, most of the terror attacks in Kenya had occurred in Nairobi. However, the number of terror attacks recorded in Nairobi between 1975 and October 2011 is far much smaller than the number of terror attacks which occurred in the same city in a span of three and a half years. Moreover, places like Garissa, which had recorded just a few terror attacks, at least until 2011, ranked the highest on the list of the most frequently attacked parts of the country, higher than Nairobi. In a day there could be more than one terror attack, and sometimes in the same place. On 5th November 2011, for instance, two separate attacks occurred concurrently in Garissa Town, one at the East African Pentecostal Church and another at Happy Church in Garissa. This is in tandem with findings in START Global Terrorism Database (2013), which indicate that by 2012 almost one-quarter of Al Shabaab attacks (22.7%) took place in Kenya, primarily in Garissa, Nairobi, Wajir, Mandera, and Ifo (START, Global Terrorism Database, 2003, p. 3). In general, terrorism spread in Kenya.

4.2.2. The Frequency of Terror Events by Weapon Types/Event Types

The 126 terror events that deteriorated Kenya's security were of different types, based on the kind of weapon used. These ranged from grenades (including hand-held, shoulder-propelled and remote-controlled grenades), improvised explosive devices (including VIEDs), bombs (including petrol bombs), guns (including AK47) and landmines. In total, 48 of the 126 terror attacks were grenade attacks. Table 4.3 identifies the various types of terror attacks that occurred in Kenya from the time Operation *Linda Nchi* was launched.

Table 4.3

Types of Terror Attacks in Kenya since the Launch of Operation Linda Nchi

Part of Kenya	Number of terror attacks
Grenade attack	48
V/IED attack	14
Bomb attack	15
Gunmen attack	37
Landmine Explosion	12
<u>Total</u>	<u>126</u>

Note. From study data

The findings are in tandem with the information by START, Global Terrorism Database (2013) which contends that the Al Shabaab’s most commonly used tactics by 2012 included bombings and armed assaults, which comprised 72.6 percent of their attacks (START, Global Terrorism Database, 2013, p. 2).

From the data presented in the table above, the use of grenades, V/IEDs , and gunmen attacks indicated, these being lighter weapons capable of being locally and easily made, that the Al Shabaab had penetrated and established presence in the country despite the on-going military operation in southern and central Somalia. From such points of operation in the country, especially along the border points, they were now attacking Kenya from within.

These attacks could have been carried out by Al Shabaab membership and/or sympathisers in the country. The use of such local weaponry as the V/IEDs indicates increasing illegal penetration of such weapons and materials for *in situ* assembling, defeating so significantly the purpose of the operation in Somalia.

From the findings, it was during such time that the KDF had suffocated the Al Shabaab and captured Kismayo hence prompting the Al Shabaab to turn to the public for social and economic support through their “liberation campaigns”. In addition, Al Shabaab was popularly using VIEDs and suicide bombings predominantly used by the Al Qaeda networks, confirming that the terrorist group had turned to Al Qaeda for support.

The study also noted that when the KDF re-opened the port of Kismayo, against the warning by the UN and the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu that such an action would allow infiltration of charcoal business by Al Shabaab (Ichani, 2015, pp. 41-49), there was indeed an indication that more Al Shabaab had penetrated Kenya, together with weapons and/or weapon making materials hidden under other goods. Most of these weapons originated from Russia and China (such as AK47 guns, Russian-made F1 grenade, rocket-propelled grenade, shoulder-propelled grenades, remote-controlled grenades, landmines) as well as from Somalia (such as home-made bombs, and remote-controlled explosive devices). This is illustrated in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4

Specific Weapon Used in Terror Attacks in Kenya

<u>Part of Kenya</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
AK 47 gun	28.0
Hand grenade	4.3
Home-made bomb	4.3
Landmine	23.1
Remote-controlled ED	8.6
Rocket-propelled grenade	8.6
Russian-made F1 grenade	23.1
Russian-made F1 grenade	23.1
<u>Total</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Note. From study data

The Westgate Mall terror siege attested to the fact that the Al Shabaab had resorted to the use of guns. During the event, about 15 masked gunmen invaded and seized the mall and held hostage a number of civilians. When countered by Kenya Police and KDF, the terrorists fiercely fought back, containing the security forces. The terror event lasted four solid days, from 21st to 24th September 2013. They also used grenades.

Al-Shabaab declared that it was responsible for the attack, adding that it was a retribution for Kenya's continued military operation against it (Alemu, 2014, p. 71; START, Global Terrorism Database, 2013, p. 4). The transnational terror gang had earlier warned, just as the operation had started, that it would launch reprisal on Kenya (START, Global Terrorism Database, 2013, p. 4).

Most of the terror events witnessed in Kenya thereafter (the second and the third years after the declared end of the Operation *Linda Nchi*) were carried out using grenades. Use of guns came in second. The study analysed the frequency distribution of terror attacks from September 2013 to June 2014 by category of weapon. Table 4.5 illustrates the findings.

Table 4.5

Frequency of Terror Events in Kenya-July 2013 to June 2014

<u>Part of Kenya</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Grenade attack	10	50
V/IED attack	1	5
Bomb attack	3	15
Gunmen attack	6	30
<u>Total</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>100%</u>

Note. From study data

From the analyses of the tables, a pattern of sustained Al Shabaab attacks was witnessed in Kenya as the Operation *Linda Nchi* went on for the many months (about 9 months, from 16th October 2011 to 20th June 2012). Just as the KDF military activities in Somalia were going on, the Al Shabaab had managed to carry out a total of 23 terror attacks in Kenya within the first 76 days (17th October to 31st December 2011) alone.

Much as proponents of pre-emptive neutralization would expect this to be a short-term increase (effect) that would quickly subside into great decrease in the number and frequency of terror attacks, the period succeeding the termination of Operation *Linda Nchi* indeed witnessed a plethora of terror events. The frequency of terror activities in Kenya changed increasingly and

sustainably over a long period after the declared end of the operation compared.

The nefarious attacks, most of which being fatal, occurred at very close intervals, as close as just minutes after the other on the same day, either in the same part of the country or in different parts. Within the first half of 2012 (1st January to 20th June 2012), the country witnessed 19 terror attacks. The first year after the re-hatting of the KDF into the AMISOM (July 2012 to June 2013), the country witnessed a total of 43 terror attacks, an attack more than during the operation.

During the operation and after the integration of the KDF troops in Somalia into the AMISOM, the frequency of terror events and the number of fatal attacks in Kenya were much higher, compared to the frequency of terror events and the number of fatal attacks in the United States in a span of 10 years (2001-2011) (START, Global Terrorism Database, 2013, p. 4).

The Al Shabaab became increasingly ‘smarter’ and its lethal capacity more manifest. The Westgate terror siege attested to this argument against all qualms. The Al-Shabaab’s bloody four-day siege on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, underscored that the military operation in Somalia had not dismantled the Al Shabaab. They seemed to have prepared well for a long siege, as a matter of fact, taking control of an easily-defendable place and proceeding to take hostages in order to buy time and be able to stage a propaganda coup.

4.3. Summary

Since Kenya launched military operation against the Al Shabaab in Somalia on 16th October, 2011, terrorism increased several-fold. The frequency of terror activities in Kenya changed increasingly, particularly from the time the operation was launched and throughout 2012, long after its termination, contrary to studies by Ichani (2014) and Alemu (2014) that the operation

was successful. These findings indeed tend to agree with Sanico et al, (2002), who observed that use of force against a terrorist campaign perpetuates the cycle of violence instead of decreasing it, an observation which Miller (2007) also shares.

Therefore, contrary to the anticipation that Kenya's military action would disrupt and/or end Al Shabaab terror activities in Kenya, thus bolster Kenya's domestic security, it is clear that the operation did not deter the Al Shabaab, neither did it prevent further terrorism in Kenya. Instead, the number of terror events increased, and this increase was sustained long after the declaration of the end of Operation *Linda Nchi*.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE COST OF TERRORISM IN KENYA SINCE OCTOBER 16 2011

5.1. Introduction

The extent to which one is secure could be inherent in the surety that their lives would not be threatened. The extent to which a country's people, including private citizens and the police, are cushioned from existential threats, terrorism in particular for this study (Brimmer et al., 2008), demonstrates that country's state of domestic security.

Various studies have found that terrorism results in loss of lives, destruction of property, widespread illness and injury, displacement of large numbers of people, and devastating economic loss, just to mention a few. Pre-emptive neutralisation theory, reinforced by Article 51 of the UN Charter read together with UN Security Council Res. 1373 of 2001, argues that counter-terrorism should ensure terrorism does not result in loss of lives and injuries, destruction of property, disruption of events and business and the economy of the country that has opted for it.

Okwir (2015) identifies costs of terrorism as economic or social; direct or indirect; physical or psychological; and individual or community. Further, he charges that the costs may be incurred as a result of physical injury; theft; damage or destruction of property; alteration of demographic composition of society; huge financial implications and burden to the affected countries; erosion of inter-communal trust; and destruction of social cohesion and integration (social capital), a *sine qua non* for national development. However, in his study he did not outline the specific costs of terrorism in Kenya as to the number of deaths and casualties, for example.

This chapter presents the study's findings on the cost of terrorism in Kenya since 16th October, 2011, when Kenya officially launched its military operation against the Al Shabaab in Somalia.

5.2. Fatalities, Injuries and Kidnappings since the Launch of Operation *Linda Nchi*

Military operation should minimize the cost of terrorism if not preventing their occurrence completely (Ganor, 2005, pp. 25-6) and thus enhance the domestic security of the state in hot pursuit. The most common costs of terrorism include fatalities, injuries and kidnappings of individuals, destruction of public and private property, and disruption of processes and events (START, Global Terrorism Database, 2013; Stephenson 2010, p. 6; Okwir, 2015).

Against this backdrop, the study analyses fatalities, injuries and kidnappings of individuals, destructions of public and private property, and disruption of processes and events in Kenya from the time of the launch of the Operation *Linda Nchi* in Somalia.

By going into Somalia, Kenya risked many deaths and other costs within its borders (Menkhaus, 2013, p. 1; Miyandazi, 2012, p. 5). This statement, however, is not backed by empirical information in the work, rendering it a mere assumption. It is against this backdrop that the study investigated the costs of terror events that occurred in Kenya, specifically from 16th October, 2011 to 30th June, 2015.

Between October 2011 and June 2015, a total of 2,607 casualties were recorded in Kenya. This included 602 people killed and 2,005 injured in the 126 terror attacks that occurred in the period. In addition, 12 persons were kidnapped. The year 2015 recorded the highest number of death, which stood at 179 by June alone. The year 2014 had the second highest, at 174 deaths while

2011 had the least due to only 76 days were considered: between 16th October and 31st December, 2011. For injuries, again just by mid-2015, the year recorded the highest number of people injured at 750 while the last 76 days of 2011 recorded 171 as the number of people who sustained injuries from terror attacks after the launch of Operation *Linda Nchi*. Table 5.1 illustrates the facts.

Table 5.1

Fatalities, Injuries and Kidnappings since the Launch of Operation Linda Nchi

Year	Fatalities	Injured	Kidnapped
2011 (from 16 th October)	32	171	4
2012	118	460	6
2013	99	402	0
2014	174	222	0
2015 (until 30 th June)	179	750	2
Total	602	2,005	12

Note. From study data.

The individuals who died in the terror events that occurred in various parts of the country included civilians (private citizens), police, military, government officers, and humanitarians (aid workers). In total, 469 civilians, 101 police officers, 26 soldiers, 4 government officers and, 2 aid workers lost their lives in Kenya, to terrorists.

Table 5.2

Distribution of Fatalities by Category

Year	Civilians	Police	KDF	Gov't officers	Humanitarians
2011 (from 16 th October	18	8	2	3	1
2012	89	17	10	1	1
2013	88	7	4	0	0
2014	130	34	0	0	0
2015 (until 30 th June)	144	35	0	0	0
Total	469	101	26	4	2

Note. From study data.

Most of these people who died in the various terror attacks had died on the spot. Some had succumbed to injuries hours or days after. Comparatively, there was an increasing trend in the number of fatalities, injuries and the kidnappings. The slight difference in figures, for example in the number of death in 2012 and in 2013, could not warrant the conclusion that terrorism was on the decline finally, since from 99 fatalities in 2013, the number of deaths increased to 174 in 2014, and to 179 just by June, 2015. Another important indicator of the increase in terror attacks in Kenya is the fact that before Kenya's military operation in Somalia, no person from the national security organs had been killed in a terror event before but a good number was killed in terror between October 16, 2011 and June 30, 2015.

Individuals who got injured in the various terror attacks in Kenya between 16th October 2011 and 16th June 2015 also included 1870 civilians, 83 police officers, 50 soldiers and 2 Government officers as shown in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3

Distribution of Injuries by Category

Year	Civilians	Police	KDF	Gov't officers
2011 (from 16 th October)	138	15	18	0
2012	390	42	27	1
2013	383	15	4	0
2014	217	5	0	0
2015 (until 30 th June)	742	6	1	1
Total	1,870	83	50	2

Note. From study data.

The number of individuals injured from the national security organs, who were actually not part of the troops fighting the Al Shabaab in Somalia, was higher than could ordinarily be expected, compared to past terror events preceding the operation. At times gunmen confronted them while on duty or at leisure or hurled grenades at them or planted landmines on their way, or as well attacked them at the stations and bases.

Hostage taking is one of the tactics used by terrorists. Other than barricade, kidnapping is one such form of hostage taking. It is also a type of terror event. The kidnapping of the four people including female Spanish Médecins sans Frontières aid workers from the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya by Al Shabaab militants into Somalia was a major basis for executing the Operation Linda Nchi (Odhiambo et al., 2012, pp. 4-8; Menkhaus, 2012, pp. 1-4; Miyandazi, 2012, p. 5). Menkhaus (2012) argues that the immediate cause of Kenya's military operation in Somalia was the kidnapping of western tourists and aid workers by suspected Al Shabaab from Somalia.

Menkhaus contends, “Most recently, a spate of cross-border kidnappings of Western tourists and aid workers by Somalis has devastated tourism along Kenya’s northern coast. The kidnappings were the pretext for Kenya’s offensive against Shabaab” (p. 3).

However, in its analysis of the effect of the operation on terror kidnappings in Kenya, the study regarded the number of individuals kidnapped by Al Shabaab since October 16, 2011. It found that shortly before the operation, on September 11, 2011, the Al Shabaab had kidnapped 1 tourist called Judith Tebbutt, a British national, at Kiwayu Island in Kenya, after killing her husband David (Menkhaus, pp. 1-3). On October 1, 2011, the terrorists kidnapped 1 more tourist, this time round a French national named Marie Dedieu from Manda Island in Kenya. Finally, the transnational terrorists kidnapped two Médecins sans Frontières aid workers of Spanish origin from Dadaab Refugee Camp on October 13, 2011.

Since Kenya launched the Operation *Linda Nchi* in Somalia, the Al Shabaab had kidnapped 12 individuals from within Kenya by June 30, 2015. Table 5.4 shows the various categories of individuals kidnapped by terrorists from Dadaab and Wajir.

Table 5.4

Terror Kidnappings in Kenya since the Launch of Operation Linda Nchi

Year	Number	Police	Gov’t officers	Aiders	Tourists
2011 (from 16 th October)	4	0	0	2	2
2012	6	4	2	0	0
2013	0	0	0	0	0
2014	0	0	0	0	0
2015 (until 30 th June)	2	2	0	0	0
Total	12	6	2	2	2

Note. From study data.

From the data, terror kidnappings increased four-fold by 30th June 2015, from 4 before the operation to 16. (Four people had been kidnapped before the operation and 12 after the operation).

5.3. Destruction and Distraction Cost of terrorism since the Launch of the Military Operation

Terror attacks could aim at destroying buildings, vehicles, and other facilities and equipment as collateral. Certain terror attacks usually only target specific facilities. A facility or infrastructure attack is a non-explosive attack on infrastructure or a building where the primary objective is to cause damage to a non-human target (e.g., a building, monument, train, and pipeline) (START, Global Terrorism Database, 2013, p. 4).

In all aspects, other than fatalities and injuries, significant costs of terror attacks that had occurred in Kenya from 16th October, 2011 included destructions of property or facilities and disruptions of activities, events and processes. These facilities ranged from private property or business, vehicles and equipment, entertainment facilities, religious premises and equipment, premises and equipment used by humanitarians, residential premises and government facilities. Among the religious facilities attacked included churches, such AIC church and Catholic Cathedral in Garissa and St. Polycarp's Anglican Church in Nairobi (NCTC, 2015). Mosques became targets and were disrupted and destroyed as well, including Hidaya and Al Amin Mosques.

Table 5.5

Destruction of Facilities since the Launch of Operation Linda Nchi

<u>Facility/Property</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
Church property	4
Mosque property	3
Entertainment business	3
Government property	4
Humanitarian property	10
KDF vehicle/equipment	14
Police vehicle/property	43
Private property	16
Public facilities/institutions	5
Transport facilities/infrastructure	4
Residential premises	4
<u>Total</u>	<u>110</u>

Note. From study data.

High-risk targets for acts of terrorism in the country also specifically included police, military and civilian government facilities included immigration/border posts, administration police patrol bases and police stations in various parts of the country. A number of the police stations and vehicles were set on fire by the Al Shabaab after attacking them. These included the Mandera Police Station, Mpeketoni Police Station and AP Camp, Gamba Police Station (*Interview with a senior police officer in Mombasa, 6th July, 2014*).

Table 5.6

State Security Bases Destroyed since the Launch of Operation Linda Nchi

Year of Attack	Base
2011	Damasa border post
	AP rural border patrol unit
	Arabia police station
	Mandera border police post
	Ifo police station
2012	Mandera military base
	Gerille police station
	Dagahaley police station
	Hulugo police station
	Kiembeni police station
2013	Pangani police station
	Mandera police station
	Mpeketoni AP base
	Mpeketoni police station
2014	Dadaab police station
	Hagdera police station

Note. From study data.

Despite Kenya's military operation against the Al Shabaab in Somalia, terrorists planned and successfully executed terror attacks on the police, senior government officers and the KDF. They

entered their stations of duty, destroying security facilities, such as had never been witnessed in the past.

Terror attacks can disrupt functions, events and systems alike. Since Kenya deployed its forces into Somalia to fight against the Al Shabaab, among losses counted after such terror attacks included disruption of humanitarian services such as aid transportation and distribution and learning institutions such as Garissa University. The frequency of disruption of various activities, processes and operations in Kenya since its military operation against the Al Shabaab in Somalia commenced were summarized and tabulated.

Table 5.7

Activities Disrupted since the Launch of Operation Linda Nchi

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
Humanitarian services	15
Education programme	4
Airport activities	2
Private business activities	18
Religious services	15
Civil services	8
Democratic processes	3
Multibillion construction projects	5
Public facilities/institutions	5
Public transport	7
Recreation and entertainment	10
Police/security response operations	31
<u>Total</u>	<u>123</u>

Note. From study data.

Various police activities were interrupted by various terror attacks, which changed the domestic security situation in Kenya. These included various police activities in the police stations attacked, including Kiembeni Police Station, Dagahaley Police Station, Pangani Police Station, Mandera Military Base, Mpeketoni Police Station and AP Patrol Base. Mass services were seriously disrupted and prematurely terminated when masked gunmen hurled grenades and fired bullets as worshippers gathered at the African Inland Church and the Catholic Central Cathedral in Garissa on 1st July 2012, killing more than 15 people and injuring more than 50 others (*Daily Nation Reporter*, 2012). Mass service in a church in Likoni in Mombasa was disrupted by gunmen who got into the church and opened fire on innocent worshippers, leaving many dead and injured. The injured included baby Satrin Osinya, with a bullet lodged in his head while his died (Oginga, 2014). In addition, churches themselves were destroyed.

Humanitarian work also faced a lot of security challenges and disruptions that messed up the outcome of the efforts they had put in. The April 3rd 2014 terror attack at the Dadaab airstrip, which is used for humanitarian purposes, exemplifies of this fact. The main entrance to the Dadaab Airstrip, a gate of great value, was reduced to debris after a powerful explosive rocked it. According to Galiacha Roba, the Dadaab District Commander in charge of operations, the thirty-minute terror attack caused extensive damage to the main gate'. In addition to the destruction of that important facility, which was usually used by humanitarian and private aircrafts, humanitarian business was paralysed subsequently. (*Field Interview*).

5.4. Economic Backlash in Kenya

Since Kenya launched the Operation *Linda Nchi* (Protect the Nation), the country witnessed various aspects of economic backlash. These ranged from decline in the tourism sector, huge spending on the operation and destruction of investments and resultant rise in unemployment.

5.4.1. Decline in the Tourism Sector

Tourism has been the third key pillar of the Kenyan economy, earner of foreign exchange for years, contributing 12 percent to the gross domestic product, generating \$1 billion a year and attracting about 1.8 million holidaymakers and sustaining one in ten jobs in the country (Tourism Sector Report, 2013).

According to a senior officer in the Ministry of EAC Affairs and Tourism at the headquarters of the ministry, the tourism sector is one of the main pillars upon which the ‘Kenyan economy heavily relied’. However, recently the sector has seen its fortunes deteriorate due to insecurity in the country, owing to frequent terrorism in the country. Mombasa, Kenya’s major tourist destination and a big foreign currency earner, witnessed declining tourist arrivals. Facts and figures released by the cabinet secretary in charge of East African affairs, commerce and tourism show that transnational terror attacks or perceptions of them, have undermined the country’s image as a tourist destination. Kenya’s economy recorded a negligible 0.5% economic growth between 2012 and 2013 (Okwir, 2015). In official Government Statement during which ‘Re-brand Kenya’s Tourism’ was unveiled, Cabinet Secretary for EAC and Tourism Ms. Phylilis Kandie did reiterate, “Kenya’s tourism gains had fallen by 7% and I attribute the downfall to increased terror activities in the country, particularly its intensification in 2013.” Ms. Kandie further noted that tourism was very sensitive to insecurity especially terrorism (Githaiga, 2014).

According to an official at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, the biggest consequence of a terrorist attack in Kenya, besides the obvious loss of lives, was its impact on tourism. Kenya's tourism suffered from the issuance of travel advisories by foreign governments. Every terror attack in Kenya was usually followed by a travel ban or a travel warning, resulting in mass checkouts of tourists from hotels, premature termination of their visits in the country and cancellations of trips by those who had already planned to come to Kenya. United Kingdom (Britain), United States, France and Australia were the most notable countries whose travel advisories affected tourism in Kenya. On 24th January 2014 for example, a travel advisory statement from the US Embassy at Nairobi read: "the Kenyan security remains on high alert following reports of an imminent terrorist attack on different parts of the country , including Nairobi and the coast, by Al Shabaab extremists" (*Confidential source*).

In addition, one of the travel advisories issued read:

Take extra security precautions if you're traveling to any of the places identified as targets of terrorists. Attacks could be indiscriminate and may occur in places frequented by foreigners, like hotels, bars, restaurants, nightclubs, supermarkets, buses, shopping centers, beaches and transport hubs.

This advisory further cautioned their nationals to avoid symbolic places.

Tourism receipts significantly fell in 2013, particularly following the Westgate Mall terror siege. Tourist numbers decreased significantly over 2013 and against expectation. Going by the various terror events witnessed in Kenya since the beginning of 2014, the numbers may increase for a long period of time, spanning beyond 2015 (Interview with a senior director at the Ministry of East African Community and Tourism).

Just before the Gikomba Bombings on 16th May, 2014, the US had warned its nationals touring Kenya as follows: ‘The U.S. government continues to receive information about potential terrorist threats aimed at U.S., Western, and Kenyan interests in Kenya, including the Nairobi area and the coastal cities of Mombasa and Diani’, (Ansari, 2014).

Shortly before the blasts, the British High Commission had evacuated 400 British holidaymakers from Mombasa following a warning by the British Foreign Office, which declared that there was an unacceptably high threat level (Ansari, 2014).

On the contrary, President Uhuru Kenyatta had dismissed these warnings, saying they ‘strengthened the will of terrorists’ and that terrorism is a problem in many other countries as well. In the week prior to the blasts, Kenya’s government required all bus passengers to be screened before boarding buses and required all buses have clear glass windows (Gridneff & Doya, 2014; Halliday, 2014).

The study discovered that at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, Nairobi, the number of tourists’ arrivals had reduced so much while the number of tourists exiting the country prematurely increased. This was directly attributed to fears that they might be attacked by the Al Shabaab and or their affiliates. Most of the tour guides and hoteliers interviewed by the study in Mombasa and Malindi added that most of the tourists who braved the security threats and toured places such as Mombasa however expressed fears for their safety. As a security precaution, they restricted themselves to specific places in the country. (*Interview with a tour guide and a fisherman at Kenyatta Public Beach*).

Most hoteliers also confirmed that business travels had also declined. Tourism-based hotels had become quite vulnerable to terrorism and that most of the tourist hotels in Nairobi and at the

Kenyan Coast that worked with tour operators working in 12 month segments could be hurt for 12-18 months. In comparison, business hotels were more suitable and almost immune to terrorism and in the event they would be affected, the effect might not span beyond 30 days (*Interview with a renowned hotelier in Mombasa City*).

In one of the beaches along the Kenyan coast, visitors were not checking in regularly. An hotelier charged, ‘...it (*camp*) has reopened, but it does not get foreign visitors....only a few Kenyans visit. Similarly, a fisherman near Mkokoni Village in Mombasa argued that owners of a certain resort could not reopen after closure due to rampant terror attacks in the area due to perception that the ‘security situation was not yet good’ (*Interview with a fisherman at Mkokoni Village in Mombasa on 17th June, 2014*).

5.4.2. Huge Spending on the Military Operation by Kenya

Apart from the huge economic losses in the tourism sector, the military operation and the resulting reprisal attacks by the Al Shabaab devastated the country’s macro-economy. The counter-terrorism war, like conventional war, resulted in great costs. The cost of the operation was estimated at Kenyan shillings 210 million (US\$2.8 million) per month, this being personnel costs alone, in 2012. In this year, Kenya recorded a Kenyan shillings 236 billion (US\$3.1 billion) total budget deficit (Crisis Group Africa, 2012). It became costly for Kenya to support its personnel and to maintain and procure military equipment and hardware. This made Kenya to seek international support, whereupon it re-hatted its military into the AMISOM and sought further support from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Although the response was positive, as Alemu (2014) contends, citing the UNSC authorisation of an increase in the AMISOM force to 17,731 troops, an increase in funding from US\$300 million per annum to around US\$500 million, and the integration of the KDF into AMISOM, the study noted an interesting coincidence. The Al Shabaab was also getting heavily funded by the Al Qaeda and sympathizers, and they intensified war against the AMISOM into which Kenya Defence Forces were integrated. In addition therefore, the KDF allocation still accounted for the largest increase in the 2012/2013 Kenya budget at Kenya Shillings70 billion. The big spending on the operation continued to stress Kenya's budget since funds to the military were partly responsible for the diversion of spending from urgent social needs, including education, health and food security (Alemu, 2014, p. 56).

5.4.3. Destruction of Businesses and Rise in Unemployment

A lot of business property was destroyed and business activities were also disrupted by various terror attacks that occurred in Kenya from the time of its military operation in Somalia. Most of these business enterprises were hotels, restaurants and clubs (except the Sasha Boutique in the Assanands Building).

Table 5.8

Commercial/Business Premises Destroyed in Terror Events since 16th October 2011

<u>Part of Kenya</u>	<u>Business premise/property</u>
Nairobi	Westgate Shopping Mall
	Gikomba Market
	Mwaura's Pub
	Sheraton Hotel
	Sasha Boutique
	Four commuter buses
Garissa	Kwa Chege Inn
	Holiday Inn
	Florida Hotel Inn
Mandera	Arabia Trading Centre
Wajir	Public Service Club, Wajir
	Government-owned club
<u>Mombasa</u>	<u>Jericho Beer Garden</u>

Note. From study data.

Most of the businesses destroyed by terrorists in Kenya were shopping centres, hotels, restaurants and clubs, and were a combination of private and public in terms of ownership. These included, to name just but a few: Mwaura's Pub, Sasha Boutique, and Sheraton Hotel, in Nairobi; Holiday Inn and Florida Inn Hotel, in Garissa; several business enterprises in Arabia Trading center, in Mandera; two Government-operated clubs, in Wajir and; at least two restaurants, including Jericho Beer Garden, in Mombasa. Some of the buildings hosting these businesses were flattened by terrorists, for example the three successive but almost simultaneous

terror explosions in Eastleigh, Nairobi, on Monday March 31, 2014, blew up the Sheraton Hotel, destroying the hosting building, stock and furniture as well as machinery and equipment of very high value. In addition, a small restaurant was ruined to debris in Eastleigh. On-goings at the Eastleigh clinic were paralysed (Njagi, 2014).

The Westgate investment was another and the most devastated of economic hubs. The terror siege at the mall by the Al Shabaab resulted in loss of businesses and employment opportunities besides the huge financial losses. It was the country's most well-known and prestigious mall and one of the main shopping and leisure centers for middle class Kenyans, expatriates and tourists. It was a real commercial, diplomatic and cultural hub of east and central Africa. It had five (5) levels, with 350,000 square feet of available retail space; 80 shops, with the largest tenants being the Nakumatt Super Market (a large Department Store that sells a variety of goods), and Planet Media Cinemas movie theaters. All these were gravely affected by the gun shots and fires caused by the Al Shabaab (Alemu, 2014, pp. 53-9).

Terrorism is the most serious impediment to foreign investment and tourism (KPMG, 2015). From 16th October 2011, terrorism greatly increased, leading to deterioration of Kenya's domestic security. This had effect on investment and tourism, two major employment sectors.

Kenya's economy is market based with investment and tourism as major industries. This is attributed to its generally friendly investment policies and regulations. The 1998 terror bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi led to decline in tourism and investment, due to negative travel advisory from Western governments (Karumba, 2014).

The terrorism situation in the country during and after the operation contributed greatly to the rise in unemployment recorded at that time. About 28,000 hotel workers at the coast laid off on

tourism downturn as a result of terror alerts which scared away international tourists and investors. International arrivals reduced to 1.35 million in 2014 from 1.5 million in 2012. “The tourism sector at the coast is almost in its knees as more than 40 hotels have so far closed down and sent parking about 95% of its workforce due to lack of business. This has been due to a string of deadly attacks on Kenya’s Indian Ocean coast, Nairobi and Garissa...” (*Interview with an official of Kenya Union of Domestic, Hotel, Educational Institutions and Allied Workers in Mombasa, 7th July, 2014*). He called on the Government to take care of the security issue.

It is noted that the period of the operation witnessed increase in unemployment. Okwir (2015) notes, “...unemployment rate in Kenya increased to 40 percent in 2011 from 12.70 percent in 2006. The unemployment rate in Kenya averaged 22.43 percent from 1999 until 2011, reaching an all-time low of 12.70 percent in 2006, as reported by the Kenyan National Bureau of statistics” (Okwir, 2015, p. 60). In fact by 23rd June 2015, it had risen to 40%, with the youth mostly affected. These youth found this convenient to turn to terrorism and radicalization, Mukami, (2015) quotes Christian Turner saying, “For Kenyan youth to make positive contribution society, we need to provide them with work. This is one way we can fight youth radicalization.”

5.5. Summary

The number of victims of terrorism increased several-fold compared to the situation before. Some people died as others got injured in grenade attacks, gunmen attacks, bomb explosions, landmine explosions; vehicle improvised explosive device attacks, petrol bomb attacks, and attacks using crude weapons such machetes in Mpeketoni and Mombasa. Other people were abducted and kidnapped. A lot of property, public and private, as well as transport and communication, residential and office premises and security infrastructures were destroyed

during the various terror attacks in Kenya. The day-to-day operations of individuals and the government (national security organs and civil servants, among others) were paralysed. A number of events, including police operations, government activities, humanitarian aid operations, as well as religious and private activities were disrupted by various terror events in Kenya, especially after launching of the military operation in Somalia.

Tourism, a key foreign income earner, was seriously hampered. Through security warnings, a good number of tourists cut short their tours in Kenya as hundreds cancelled their planned trips to the country. In addition, major and minor hotel and hospitality businesses closed down, sending home hundreds of employees as tourism-based self-employments went down in Nairobi, Maasai Mara and along the coast (Mombasa, Kwale, Malindi, Lamu, and Kilifi). These manifest the inability of the operation to reduce the costs of terrorism in Kenya.

The decline in tourism, the huge spending on the operation, and the destruction of businesses witnessed between October 16, 2011 and June 30, 2015 as a result of terrorism in Kenya, are far much greater, both in frequency and magnitude, compared to those of the period between 1975, when the first terror attack occurred in Kenya, and the time Kenya launched the military operation against the Al Shabaab in Somalia.

CHAPTER SIX

KENYA'S VULNERABILITY TO TERRORISM

6.1. Introduction

This chapter addresses the third objective of the study: evaluating the terror vulnerability of Kenya; and exploring the perceptions of the domestic population regarding their safety and the general security in Kenya.

Vulnerability to terrorism is viewed in terms of exploitable capability; an exploitable security weakness or deficiency at a facility, entity, venue, or of a person and the nature of the people's perception based on the level of terrorism, which affects their resilience to terrorism; the level of fear created among the public by terrorism, in terms of their views on the government's strategy and its ability to combat terrorism; and the extent of publicity that terrorists have received for their causes.

6.2. Vulnerability of National Security Organs/Security Departments

Vulnerability of domestic security would manifest in any incident that might offer a potential threat to the population and their property, public or private, and or derail the efforts of the government to prevent and contain insecurity (Reese, 2013:11). The threats may also be perceived to be potential or actual, irrespective of the vulnerability status as per standards as to high, medium or low (Kenaan, 2014:23).

Kagwanja (2007) notes that terrorism has become the greatest threat to security within states in the Horn of Africa, increasing their vulnerability to terrorism (Kagwanja, 2007, p. 3). While this study appreciates terrorism as a major threat to Kenya, Kagwanja the study is fairly older than

Kenya's military operation in Somalia and the study findings cannot suffice to explain Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism after the operation.

In Kenya, from the findings of this study as presented in the previous chapter, the terrorists had indeed attacked police officers, soldiers, their bases and equipment. In addition, the study found indications of a rise in domestic radicalization and emerging terrorist cells in Kenya. The study found that the terrorists would possibly attack critical infrastructure in Kenya, particularly intelligence equipment and networks, power grid systems, oil pipelines and water reservoirs, tanks and pipes.

6.2.1. Deterioration of the Capacity of National Security Organs

Since the September 2011 terror attack on the United States, the role of the police seemed to have shifted from low policing to high policing. The police as well through low policing can play a large role in counterterrorism (Innes, 2010). Traffic police can conduct stop checks and may detect transportation of explosives (Henry, 2002). In Kenya, the police have been covertly involved in the war against terrorist/sm, alongside the military. This includes, but is not limited to, clandestine intelligence collection and disruption of terrorists' plans and activities, and indeed a special unit, the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU), which was set up specifically to deal with terrorism, albeit by way of prevention.

The large number of national security personnel killed and injured and those kidnapped; the at least 16 police stations and patrol bases, 2 military bases and 2 border posts invaded; the at least 39 police and military vehicles and equipment attacked; and the many instances of terrorists robbing the security agencies of weapons and equipment and dismantling intelligence and communication systems, have deteriorated the capacity of the national security organs. This has

weakened their effectiveness and efficiency in protecting civilians and their property, as well as the government and its property, against terrorism.

The deeper implication therefore is that the inability and ineffectiveness of the police to conduct covert detection of terrorists, their plans and activities, greatly increased. This, consequently, explains why the police were not able to prevent and contain a number of terror incidents that occurred in Kenya from 16th October 2011. In addition, weakened to such an extent, the police might not be able to disrupt terrorist plots and they may not effectively and efficiently conduct terror risk analysis. The Westgate Mall terror siege which began on 21st September 2013 and ended four days later is one of the pieces of empirical evidence of terror vulnerability of the security agents (Blair & Lough, 2013). Further to this, the study examined the Mpeketoni attacks. In the attack, an AP Patrol Base and Mpeketoni Police Station were attacked. The following day, when the police received reinforcement, hoping to deal with the terrorists, a good number of those who died in the subsequent attacks were policemen (Some, 2014).

It became difficult for the police to mobilize the community for prevention of terrorism. They may not effectively protect individuals, private property and critical infrastructure. The attack on the Westgate and the killing of not less than 4 police officers and 6 soldiers demonstrated the weakness of the police in protecting important facilities and people (Some, 2014).

The penetration and disruption of communications equipment in the increased attacks on the police weakened their capability. On 11th January 2012, the Al Shabaab, after raiding the Gerille AP Camp, killing 7 people and abducting 3 Government Officials, shut down all communication in the area (NCTC, 2015). The effect was that intelligence informers were unable to communicate with the authorities and that the terrorist managed to steal their way into Somalia.

In addition, the fact that the police had been given intelligence information prior to certain terror attacks but failed to respond effectively denotes their demoralization and increased fear for their own lives.

The terror attacks on the security department, more so the police, manifest significant increase in vulnerability to insecurity and significant frustration in their efforts to deal with terrorism, among other forms of insecurity. The police are important to the extent that should a terror incident occur, they are expected to maintain order so that further injuries or fatalities are prevented (Posen, 2001). In addition, the police secure the scene by cordoning it off and guarding it until it is assessed and its safety declared. However, with increased attacks on the police, their numbers are going down and their arrival at terror scenes may be reluctant, ineffective and inefficient. The fact that the Kenyan security agents, including the police and KDF, were increasingly targeted by the terrorists derailed their ability and confidence to mitigate terrorist damage. Mandera Police Station, Mpeketoni Police Station and the Administration Police Camp in Mpeketoni were burnt down by terrorists. It took the police headquarters more than 10 hours to send police to the scene. Again, as the reinforcement took charge, attackers killed another fifteen more people, including at least four policemen (Some, 2014).

The terror attacks on several police officers and police stations also disrupted various activities of the police. Their work in executing criminal investigation of terror incidents would be very difficult.

Now, the weakening capacity and capability of the police due to the terror attacks; their killing and the destruction of their vehicles and other equipment as well as their work stations; and the breaking into their armoury and stealing of their weapons; no doubt, has derailed the efforts of

Kenyan security agents to prevent, deter and contain terrorism among other facets of insecurity within the country.

The study thus noted that the military operation in Somalia invited terror attacks on the police. The fact that the police were increasingly becoming the major target of the terrorists, again no doubt, was a manifestation that Kenya's security vulnerability was on the rise. The terror disruption of communication equipment owned by the state intelligence agencies and by the private communications corporations paralysed intelligence gathering and reporting by Government agencies. That was a sabotage attack and it signified Kenya's increasing vulnerability to terrorism.

6.3. Vulnerability of Critical Installations to Terrorism

Apart from the security departments, strategic installations have increasingly become targets of terror. Terrorists can target strategic installations in a country either as a means to achieving a bigger goal or the goal itself. They might do this to get attention or in order to disrupt strategic systems so that they can smoothly execute their terror activities. The study thus examined Kenya's vulnerability with respect to possible attacks on strategic systems and equipment.

The first case in point regarding destruction and/or disruption of strategic installations was the vandalizing of communication equipment by terrorists in Gerille in January 2012. On 11th January 2012, the Al Shabaab, after raiding the Gerille AP Camp, killing 7 people and abducting 3 Government Officials, closed down all communication in the area (NCTC, 2015). The penetration and disruption of the communications equipment weakened capability of the police due to increased attacks on them.

In their article titled 'Kenya Oil Pipeline and Terrorism' (2012), Odhiambo et al., (2012) contends that Al Shabaab had threatened to attack critical infrastructure, particularly oil pipeline in Kenya. This implied the vulnerability of the strategic energy sector to terrorism. When the study interviewed him, Odhiambo et al. also a military officer and religious leader, observed that Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) should be a key component of the national security strategy for combating terrorism in Kenya. According to him, there were facts indicating attempts by the Al Shabaab to attack oil pipeline systems in Kenya and the government 'should empower and partner with the private security firms' to protect pipeline infrastructure.

Water has been used as a military and political target for over 2,500 years (Odhiambo et al., 2012). Since there is no substitute for water, water resources and systems are attractive targets for terrorists. Any kind of interruption, be it physical supply interruption or contamination, will certainly pose insecurity to humanity. From field interviews, one common perception, particularly among KDF soldiers and the police, was that besides the fears that the Al Shabaab had the capability, both potential and real, and could attack anywhere in this country, including the oil infrastructure, the transnational terrorists could turn on water supply systems and reservoirs. The Al Shabaab could possibly turn to sabotage strategy and that the water infrastructure could easily be targeted directly or contaminated through the introduction of poison or pathogens. This could result in communal disruptions and disarray, a lethal disaster and a potential existential threat. The government, according the perceptions of several Kenyans, must deploy security guards to boost private security guarding water facilities. In addition, the quality of the water must be assessed regularly.

6.4. Rise in Domestic Radicalization and Emergence of Terrorist Cells

The concept of radicalization has no universally agreed upon meaning but, arguably, radicalization may denote a process of reacting to a state of ideals; embracing extremist ideology, be it political, social, or religious; and tolerating violence as a means to achieving ideological goals (Schmid, 2013). It may be at individual or group level and may begin with changes in self-identification, due to grievances, frequently driven by personal or group concerns regarding local issues as well as international events. It provides the ‘convert’ with a new outlook and explanation for the surrounding as they slowly integrate into a community of other like-minded people and finally into action (Alejandro, 2007). This is one of the most dangerous threats to a country’s domestic security. It significantly increases the number of terrorists and their distribution in the country; increases security threats and incidents thus increasing the country’s terror vulnerability by far and wide (Ackerman, 2013).

Domestic radicalization has been a key concern to countries involved in the war on terror such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark, and now Kenya. When domestic radicalization occurs in a country, obviously, the number of terrorists and terror events increases significantly, and the fact that they are homegrown is more dangerous than if they were to come from outside (Ackerman, 2013). In the United States, between 11th September, 2001, and 31st December, 2009, at least 46 terror incidents were linked to domestic radicals and at least 125 people were jihadists led by a radical Muslim cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who was accused of recruiting for Al Qaeda and the Al Shabaab and who increasingly advocated violent jihad (START, Global Terrorism Database, 2013, pp. 4-8).

Another good case in point on how domestic radicalization can increase terror vulnerability in a state is the Al Shabaab in Somalia. The extremists have even denied the government operation in several parts of the country. In fact, even until June 2014, some parts of Mogadishu were effectively controlled by the terrorists due to the wider support they enjoy among the domestic population who subscribe to their cause. Another case in point is the Boko Haram, which has succeeded in radicalizing a good number of Nigerians, increasing the country's vulnerability to terrorism (Onuoha, 2014, p. 3). Could there be domestic radicalization and recruitment in Kenya since the military operation?

It is a reality that Kenya shares a very expansive border with Somalia, making it have several border points. It is contended that Kenya however lacked the capacity to effectively monitor the loosely guarded border points. (Okwir, 2015, p. 60). This put Kenya in a precarious situation as it continued its military operation in Somalia. As a result of the decision by Kenya Defence Forces to reopen Kismayo border point against the warning by the UN and the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu, more Al Shabaab might have got their way into Kenya together with weapons and/or weapon making materials hidden under other goods, millions of illegal money and radicalization materials and content and extremists ideology.

According to Criminal Investigation Department officers interviewed, the drive to recruit locals, Muslims and Christians alike, was an option considered by the Al Shabaab. Eastleigh, in particular, had been known as a center for Al Shabaab recruitment and fundraising. Since Kenya entered Somalia to dismantle the Al Shabaab, Eastleigh became the obvious Al Shabaab alternative base. This is where, the police believed, subsequent terror attacks were planned and executed. By 2011, the Al Shabaab had recruited as many as 500 Kenyan youths. Since then,

Kenyan police have arrested dozens of suspected recruits, who have crossed back into Kenya (Menkhaus, 2012, p. 8).

In early 2012, Mombasa was increasingly becoming a terror domain. A Kenyan, Sheikh Ahmed Iman Ali, the founder of the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) based at the Pumwani Mosque, was named Al-Shabaab's leader and coordinator in Kenya (International Crisis Group, 2012:8). Besides Sheikh Ahmed Iman Ali, other people who, through their wealth and health, supported and promoted Islamic extremism included Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohammed. The Islamic terrorist was a key fundraiser and mobilizer for the Al Shabaab. At that time, the Al Shabaab had formed an alliance with Al Qaeda, which was funding it, training it and helping it with new fighting tactics and technology. Following Rogo's killing, protests and violence by over 2000 Kenyans ensued, and two churches were looted then destroyed. As the police neared the crowd in an attempt to create order, three policemen were killed. Rogo was the fifth alleged Islamic radical killed in Kenya in 2012 (Alemu, 2014, p. 82).

The increasing domestic radicalization was directly attributed to the continued Kenyan military operation in Somalia and unnecessary harassment by police. Some citizens, angered by the mistreatment, had been turning into Al Shabaab sympathizers, fundraisers and financiers. (*Interview with a businessman near Fort Jesus, 7th July, 2014*). The new recruits were obligated with identifying and attacking critical targets and getting away. (*Interview with a police officer in the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Central Police Station, Mombasa, 8th July, 2014*) Some portion of the domestic population sympathized with, joined and/or financed the Al Shabaab, feeling that Kenya's decision to pursue the terrorists into Somalia was not appropriate. In addition, non-Muslim youths who turned to Al Shabaab, 'found a job in terrorism while some

would have got the opportunity to fight against the government for excuses of unemployment and rising cost of living'. (*Interview with a police officer in the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Central Police Station, Mombasa, 8th July, 2014*). This perception was validated by the fact that the period of the operation witnessed increase in unemployment. . Unemployment rate in Kenya increased to 40 percent in 2011 from 12.70 percent in 2006. The unemployment rate in Kenya averaged 22.43 percent from 1999 until 2011, reaching an all-time low of 12.70 percent in 2006, as reported by the Kenyan National Bureau of statistics". Okwir, 2015, p. 60).

In Mombasa city and residential areas around it, a state of insecurity was felt. The Al Shabaab increasingly targeted innocent individuals and groups in places of worship. There had been concerns that many people were joining the Al Shabaab at an increasing rate. In addition, members of the Al Shabaab used diversionary tactics, such that those who were hitherto Muslims were camouflaging. Some of them had 'converted' to Christianity, or simply avoided Muslim culture (*Interview with a police officer in the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Central Police Station, Mombasa, 8th July, 2014*).

Quite a number of terror events in Kenya had therefore been carried out by local Al Shabaab recruits. Among the terror attacks in Kenya which the police believed were executed by domestic terrorists included the April 4, 2012 bomb attacks on a church in Mtwapa; the June 2014 Mpeketoni and Maporomoko attacks; and the several attacks in 2014, including on buses and religious places, on Gikomba Market and on military and police convoys in Lamu. The September 2013 Westgate Mall terror siege must have been, in part, carried out by local Al Shabaab. (Akwiri, 2014).

Before his death, and a trend which repeated itself even after his demise, Rogo categorically hailed the Al Shabaab networks in Kenya for any terror event attributable directly to them. He was quoted as saying, “In this country we (Muslims) live among infidels.” And he repeated his claim that Muslims in the Kenyan security services were infidels.

The May 16, 2014 terror attack on Gikomba market in Nairobi was also planned and executed by Kenyan Al Shabaab, and was pronounced successful by the Al Shabaab leadership (Ansari, 2014). After the Al Shabaab attack on KDF soldiers, killing two of their numbers in Lamu, the terrorists, through Fuad Mohamed Khalaf, Commander of the Al Shabaab, immediately claimed responsibility and hailed its members for a job well done (Moore, 2014; Gridneff and Doya, 2014).

In the next section, the study presents analyses of the perceptions of individuals on their safety and security in Kenya.

6.5. The Perception on the Effect of Operation *Linda Nchi* on Domestic Security

Public perception is an imperative indicator of the extent of safety from terrorism and, thus, a measure of the state of domestic security in a state (Defence Threat Reduction Agency, 2003). Terrorist violence thrives on psychological impact, not just on the number of people killed, injured or kidnapped, or facilities and systems destroyed or disrupted. Terrorists measure their success by the ability to terrorize their enemies and the capacity to attract a wider sympathy and support base by creating uncertainty and fear as a way of winning hearts and minds (ibid). Terrorism brings to mind dramatic images of disaster, such as planes flying into the Twin Towers in New York, which prevents people from weighing up the small probabilities of such events (Defence Threat Reduction Agency, 2003, pp. 4-26).

Fear of terrorism can be gauged by how the vulnerable domestic population view their security at home, at work, when travelling, while in social and public places; the changing pattern of foreigners visiting the said country either as tourists or investors; and the state of local investment, among others. In the United States, for example, following the September 11, 2001 terror attack, the perceived risk of terrorism on the US soil was elevated. Such increase in threats as perceived by the masses affects their attitudes, cognitive processes and behaviour (Huddy, Friedman, Capelos & Provost, 2002, pp. 486). The number of people flying locally and the number of people from abroad reduced (Sivak & Flannangan, 2003).

The study sampled perceptions of Kenyans on the security situation in Kenya by conducting an adversarial analysis of the safety of Kenyans at their workplaces including government offices, business premises and facilities as well as in processes.

6.5.1. Workplace and Residential Areas Vulnerability to Terrorism

Since Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) crossed into Somalia, many government officials had been killed, injured or kidnapped by terrorists while on duty. In addition, certain residential areas, such as Eastleigh in Nairobi, had become much insecure following various terror attacks in or around the places. The study conducted a number of interviews with individuals from various workplaces and residential areas in the country.

According to an officer at the Police Headquarters (Vigilance House) in Nairobi, staff had been warned that the security in the country was under threats of terrorism and that they needed to be vigilant even at workplace. In relating terrorism and domestic security, respondents argued that terrorism was one of the main facets of security and one of the greatest threats to Kenya's domestic security at the time: 'Terrorism is insecurity itself! I fear terrorists much more than I

fear thieves breaking into my house. Today in Kenya we hear more of terror attacks than burglary and robbery...’ (*Interview with a Senior Police Officer at Vigilance House, Nairobi, 4th July, 2014*)

With a lot of fear visible in their facial expressions and body movements, other respondents reiterated that even the President was not immune to terrorism. One argued; “If the President is unsafe, can I be? They (terrorists) can even bomb us from the air, swallow bombs and come around here to die with us.... you never know who they are!” (*Interview with a senior staff (civilian) at Vigilance House, Nairobi, 4th July, 2014*)

At the Anti-Terror Police Unit in Old Nairobi Area, nearly all responses included phrases such as ‘the security situation is not that good’. One respondent informed the study that police officers had since been deployed around government buildings to beef up security against terrorism. She argued; “We have beefed up security around here... the Al Shabaab and their networks are a reality and therefore we should not take chances... we have become one of the key targets of terrorists because we fight them.” (*Interview with a senior Police Officer, Anti-Terror Police Unit, Old Nairobi Area, 3rd July, 2014*)

At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, security was tightened and members of staff were more conscious of their security. According to one Deputy Head of Division, the ministry did not take any chances with security issues. There was only one entry/exit for both staff and clients, a security officer manning the building revealed. (*Interview with a security officer (Administration Police Officer) at the gate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Nairobi, 1st July, 2014*). Everyone was subjected to thorough security screening. Invitations to state events were carefully scrutinized and double efforts were put in to

provide security during such events. (*Interview with Head of Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Nairobi, 1st July, 2014*).

According to the Deputy Head of Division Horn of Africa, the ministry had put in place tough security procedures. She argued; "... Nowadays we are very careful; we do not want to risk our lives and the lives of our guests. When invited by foreign missions, we are cautious of our security. In case the events are held at the premises of the Missions, there must be heavy presence of the police and private security first. If they are held at hotels, the Government of Kenya must provide adequate security." (*Interview with Deputy Head of Division Horn of Africa, 30th June, 2014*).

According to protocol officers at the Protocol Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the US Embassy and the International Rescue Committee working with foreign missions and international organizations in Kenya, 'every day was a security awareness day' since Kenya Defence Forces crossed over to Somalia. Most of these entities had enhanced their security systems and did research and conveyed security reports and alerts almost after every two hours daily. In addition to local security briefs and alerts, the home countries of the foreign missions had since been researching and updating them constantly. (*Interview with Protocol Officers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 3rd July, 2014*). In the view of a senior officer at the Ministry of East African Affairs and Tourism at Teleposta House, there was need to protect the building, officers working in it and its clients for fear of possible terror attacks. (*Interview with a senior officer Ministry of East African Affairs and Tourism, 2nd July, 2014*)

The spate of terror attacks that had been witnessed in the country from 16th October 2011 to June 2015 and the resulting costs had invited a lot of fear among public servants and teachers in parts of the country that had experienced higher frequency of terror attacks such as Mandera, Wajir, Lamu, Garissa and refugee camps. This was exhibited by worrying calls made by teachers and doctors' representatives for the withdrawal of their staff from the worst insecurity-prone regions in the country (KNCHR, Occasional Report, 2014, p. 9). In particular, teachers, doctors and other public servants, including civil servants in Garissa, Mandera and Lamu, lived in fear of terrorism which indeed had killed and left injured a number of such Kenyans. (*Interview with an Assistant County Commissioner, Mandera County, 27th June, 2014*).

Individuals operating businesses in Nairobi's central business district (CBD) and at the Westgate Shopping Mall interviewed by the study contended that they worked in fear of terror. (*Interview with an individual operating a medium-scale business in Nairobi, 18th June, 2014*) According to a surviving victim of the Sasha Boutique terror incident of 2012, although she could not shut down the business that was her means of survival, operating near the building and the experiences she had gone through when terror had struck her kept scaring her life. A computer specialist who had been operating at the Westgate Shopping Mall, but who afterwards operated from a nearby building, contended that he had lost most of his clientele since the attack. (*Interview with victims of terrorism, Nairobi, 19th June, 2014*)

Kiambeni Police Station in Mombasa had been attacked by terrorists at least twice since Kenya started executing its military operation in Somalia. The study interviewed four police officers at the station. While expressing his perception on the workplace security at police stations across the country, a senior police officer at Kiambeni argued; "You are aware that the Kiambeni Police

Station was attacked by terrorists and that the one at Mandera was ruined beyond repair! Just see! We never heard of such cases before. We are insecure!” (*Interview with a senior police officer at Kiembeni Police Station, 7th July, 2014*).

According to another respondent at the station, police stations were targets of terrorists because terrorists perceived the police as barriers. The increased attacks on the security departments were efforts by the terrorists to compromise the police and dissuade them from pursuing, arresting and neutralizing their members. They were also due to increase in Al Shabaab recruits at the Coast. According to bankers in Mombasa and Malindi, terrorism ringed more times in their minds than robbery. A number of aid workers at the Dadaab Refugee Complex, in Kakuma and in Garissa, lived in fear of terrorism. (*Interview with senior Red Cross staff, 9th July, 2014*).

The Awer, or Boni, ethnic group, who relied largely on selling forest products and honey for their livelihood along the Lamu County coastline, had negative perception of their safety and could no longer go into the forests without risking abduction or being labeled Al Shabaab sympathizers. They also feared being attacked by the military, who believed the Al Shabaab had been forcibly recruiting their young people as fighters. One of the respondents argued; “We are hunter-gatherers and our livelihoods depended on the forests that are now military fields. People cannot go about their normal businesses.” (*Interview with a Muslim Cleric from Awer Community, 23rd June, 2014*)

The study also explored the perceptions of individuals about the security situation at places of residence. The most insecure residential areas, prone to terrorism, in Nairobi were Eastleigh and Mathare. Respondents interviewed by the study expressed their fear saying they could not live in such places because of rampant terrorism. Indeed, a number of landlords interviewed by the

study lamented that their tenants were relocating to other places perceived to be safe such as Kangemi or Kibra. According to a desk officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, most diplomatic missions had advised their staff to remain alert in residential areas and avoid routes going through ‘unsecure’ residences. (*Interview with a 1st Counsellor at the Horn of Africa Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 9th July, 2014*).

In Mombasa, residential areas such as Likoni, Kongowea, Tononoka area, Kigongo and Kisumu Ndogo, officers interviewed felt insecure, fearing that a number of Al Shabaab networks resided within or around them. In addition, residential places around the city and those in the South Coast could easily be attacked by terrorists. At Likoni Ferry, Kenyans who resided in Likoni’s informal settlements feared that terrorists could attack them even at home. (*Interview with a police officer at Likoni Ferry, Mombasa, 10th July, 2014*). The study interviewed fishmongers believed to be residents of Likoni slums who confirmed the fears adding that they were also insecure while crossing the sea to and from island Mombasa. (*Interview with fishmongers at Likoni Ferry, 10th July, 2014*).

Refugee camps, such as the Dadaab Complex, were not the best places to reside. Since Kenya went to Somalia in pursuit of the terrorists, the complex had witnessed more than five terror attacks, with at least three of them blowing up refugee shelters. Perceiving their habitat as dangerous, most refugees decided to move out of the refugee camps to other places such as Garissa and Nairobi to seek secure refuge, according to a representative of the refugees at Ifo Camp II in Dadaab complex. To corroborate this statement, the refugee worker alluded to various Government orders redirecting refugees back to camps. (*Interview with an aid worker at*

Ifo Camp II, 26th June, 2014). This implied that these refugees had fled the camps due to the perceived insecurity.

6.5.2. The Vulnerability of Places of Worship, Recreation and Entertainment

Places of worship that had been attacked since the KDF launched the Operation *Linda Nchi* included churches and mosques. The attacks on places of worship led to decline in the size of congregations. (*Interviews with a pastor at the East African Pentecostal Church and an evangelist at the Happy Church both in Garissa town, July, 2014*) A good number of congregants preferred saying their prayers at home lest they be attacked by the Al Shabaab in places of worship. (*Interview with a priest in Mtwapa, Kilifi, 7th July, 2014*).

At the God's House of Miracle International Church at Ngara Estate in Nairobi, which had been attacked by the Al Shabaab or their networks on 29th April 2012, killing one person and injuring 15 others (Police Crime Report 2012:3), there was heavy security as the service went on. Yet still, most of the congregants were not sure of their security and at times could not close their eyes while prayers went on. (*Interview with an Evangelist at God's House of Miracle International Church, Ngara, Nairobi, 27th June, 2014*)

A previous terror attack on the Catholic cathedral in Garissa had scared priests and congregants. Most priests usually conducted services in terrible fears. (*Interview with a Catholic priest at the Catholic Cathedral in Garissa County, 24th June, 2014*) "The attacks are as a result of religious fundamentalism, and this happens across the religious divide. Mosques are also attacked. They too are under terror threat," the priest further argued (ibid).

In reference to the Hidaya Mosque terror incident, in which the Honourable Member for Kamukunji Constituency Yusuf Hassan, among several others, was injured in December 2012, most of the faithful feared for their security and that the mosque might have lost quite a number of members up to then. (*Interview with Muslim Cleric at Hidaya Mosque, Eastleigh, Nairobi on 25th June, 2014*). A Muslim cleric posited; “It is true that some of the Muslims have unfortunately given in to the Al Shabaab extremists, who are pursuing fundamentalist ideas... the moment we discover them, they either quit or camouflage by becoming pseudo-Christians.” (*Interview with Muslim Cleric at Hidaya Mosque, Eastleigh, Nairobi on 27th June, 2014*).

All respondents interviewed said they were unsafe in church gatherings and most of them preferred to worship at home.

The study also gathered the views and perceptions of individuals on their safety while at recreation and entertainment places. The first public place to be attacked by terrorists after Kenya launched its military operation against the Al Shabaab was the Mwaura’s Pub down Mfangano Street in Nairobi. Pubs in Nairobi, Mombasa, Garissa, Mandera, Wajir and Lamu had been exposed to terrorism and were no longer popular. One of the respondents said, “Most of our customers either moved to other low-profile pubs or decided to quit revelling for fear that they might fall into the hands of terrorists.” (*Interview with a hotel manager in Mombasa, 6th July, 2014*).

Foreign missions in the country had cautioned tourists and visitors from their motherlands to avoid visiting certain public places such as parks, beaches, stadia, nightclubs, bars, restaurants, supermarkets and transport hubs, fearing imminent terror attacks.

Following the June 24, 2012 grenade terror attack inside the Jericho Beer Garden in Mombasa City, which killed three and wounded 30 football fans watching a Euro 2012 quarter-final match, people feared for their safety in entertainment areas. Most of the people who survived various terror attacks, more so at public places such as pubs, had since never returned. Despite re-branding and new management, only a few new clubbers were visiting. (*Interview with a surviving victim of Jericho Beer Garden grenade attack, 7th July, 2014*). Mwembe Tayari, Likoni Ferry, Mama Ngina Public Beach, Kenyatta Public Beach, were insecure places for both the police and the ordinary people.

All public places within Mombasa CBD and South Coast were quite insecure and any function taking place required heavy security. Further, the Al Shabaab was keen on killing Christians even at home. (*Interview with a senior police officer at Central Police Station, Mombasa, 7th July, 2014*). This argument was sustained by the Mpeketoni attacks in which people were killed in their houses, more specifically Christians', the April 2, 2015 Garissa University gunmen terror attack, the various bus terror attacks in Mandera and Garissa witnessed in 2014 and 2015, among others. In Mpeketoni, one of the respondents said, "They came to our house at around 8.00 pm and asked us in *Swahili* whether we were Muslims. My husband told them we were Christians and they shot him in the head and chest."

As reflected in the various perceptions domestic populations held concerning their safety and the general security, the situation in Kenya was not good. The perceptions were shared across the country, among locals and foreigners, government officers, including the police, civil servants, military men, business people, religious leaders, humanitarians, fishermen and all.

6.6. Summary

From the findings on the prevailing security situation in Kenya since it launched military operation in Somalia, it is clear that national security organs (the security departments) have become terror targets, especially the police (personnel, duty stations and equipment); the security of strategic installations, especially essential ones such as water and oil reservoirs and pipelines, has deteriorated, since they have increasingly become terror targets; domestic radicalization and emergence of terrorist cells in the country are on the rise since Kenya launched the operation; the Al Shabaab, as a survival strategy, has turned to local recruitment and has recruited Muslims and Christians alike.

In this situation, people question their security at workplaces, in public transport, in places of worship, in residential areas in the urban, among others, which are perceived to be insecure. People fear going about their normal business for they could fall victim to terrorists and, along the coast, to the military as well. Tourism has been hampered, with hotels closing down in Mombasa for example.

Thus Kenya's military operation in Somalia may have been intended to be both pre-emptive and preventive, aiming at increasing Kenya's capabilities and hardening it against terrorism hence restoring confidence that it was a safe state immune to terrorism; however, the findings demonstrate that vulnerability has significantly increased, a clear indication that the operation was not the best option.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Introduction

Based on the lack of consensus on the utility of counterterrorism in enhancing domestic security, the study investigated the effect of Kenya's military operation against the Al Shabaab in Somalia has on its domestic security. This entailed determination of the frequency of terror events; determination of the cost of terrorism in Kenya; and assessment of Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism since Operation *Linda Nchi* was launched. The perception of purposively selected respondents on public safety and general security in Kenya after the 'Operation *Linda Nchi*' was launched was assessed. In this chapter, summary of findings, conclusion, and recommendations resulting from the study have been presented. In the next section of this chapter, summary of the findings has been done to inform the conclusion.

7.2. Summary of Findings

7.2.1. The effect of Kenya's Military Operation against the Al Shabaab on Frequency of Terror Attacks in Kenya

The study found that the overt Al Shabaab activities in Kenya days before Kenya launched the Operation *Linda Nchi* were the immediate justification for Kenya to wage war against the transnational terrorists as a way of enhancing its domestic security. Nevertheless, Kenya had been planning how to deal with the rising transnational terrorist group which posed existential threats to Kenya among other countries, and was already working on creating a buffer zone referred to as '*Jubaland Initiative*' as a way of preventing the Al Shabaab from crossing over to Kenya.

Further, the study found that the Kenya Defence Forces tried to 'secure' the Kenya-Somalia border and had 'neutralized' a number of Al Shabaab bases. However, the Al Shabaab were not destroyed completely but were only disabled in part. As Kenya carried out the military operation, and cleared the various posts specifically Kismayo of the terrorists disrupting their illegal businesses, the Al Shabaab sought help from the Al Qaeda and increasingly became 'smarter' and its lethality was increasingly becoming effective. A significant number of terror attacks believed to have been carried out by the Al Shabaab have been recorded in Kenya between 16th October 2011 and June 2015.

During that period, a total of 126 terror events attributed to and/or for which the Al Shabaab claimed responsibility were recorded in Kenya. The year 2012 recorded 53 terror attacks this being the year with the highest number of terror attacks while 2013 recorded 12, being the year with the lowest number of terror attacks. Most of these terror attacks occurred in Garissa (32), Nairobi (25) and Mandera (24). While the frequency of terror events in Kenya reduced to 12 in 2013, the Al Shabaab was intensifying its fight against the KDF under AMISOM and AMISOM in general, in Somalia.

From the study, in 2012 KDF had made some positive gain in terms of reducing the capacity of the Al Shabaab. This explains the lower number of terror attacks in Kenya in 2013. The 12 terror attacks in 2013 being the lowest notwithstanding, the Al Shabaab continued with reprisal terror activities in Kenya, and the Westgate Mall Terror Siege is citable. The Al Shabaab, while claiming responsibility for the incident, argued that the event was a retribution for the Kenyan military's deployment in Somalia following its earlier reprisal warnings it had issued in the wake of Operation Linda Nchi from 2011 to 2012 (Alemu, 2015; Kamau, 2013).

It therefore turned to “nationalistic campaigns” among local Somalis against the KDF, sought training and financial support from Al Qaeda. In Kenya, it sought sympathy and financial support from people like Aboud Rogo and youths and was able to use them to perpetrate terrorism in Kenya now using locally assembled weapons such as home-made bombs and IEDs. In 2014, 20 terror attacks were witnessed and by end of June 2015, 18 terror attacks had occurred in Kenya. The most used weapon by the Al Shabaab or in the 126 terror attacks was grenade mostly China-made and A47 guns. This revealed that

Generally, the nefarious attacks most of which being lethally fatal, occurred at very close intervals as close as minutes after the other on the same day either around the same part of the country or at different parts of the country. This frequency of terror attacks in Kenya was much higher compared to the frequency of terror events and the number of fatal attacks in the United States in a span of 10 years (2001-2011) (START, Global Terrorism Database, 2013). Kenya’s strive to demonstrate that it was a ‘hard state’ was not achieved.

7.2.2. The Effect of Kenya’s Military Operation against the Al Shabaab on the Costs of Terrorism in Kenya

The study found that the cost of terrorism increased in Kenya after Kenya launched its military operation against the Al Shabaab in Somalia. From 16th October, 2011 to 30th June, 2015, a total of 2,607 casualties were recorded in Kenya in the 126 terror events that characterized Kenya’s domestic security. This included 602 people killed and 2,005 injured. The year 2015 recorded the highest number of deaths by June alone. Since the operation was launched, 9 persons have kidnapped in the various terror events in the period. Mostly killed, injured and kidnapped were civilians, followed by civil servants, the police and the military, and others who included foreigners (tourists, aid workers and at least a diplomat). In total, 469 civilians, 101 police

officers, 26 soldiers, 4 government officers and, 2 aid workers lost their lives in Kenya, to terrorists. This number increased several-fold compared to the situation before Kenya launched the operation.

The slight difference in the number of death in 2012 and in 2013 did not necessarily imply that terrorism was on the decline finally. The number of deaths increased from 99 in 2013 to 174 in 2014, and to 179 just by June, 2015. In addition, at least 127 police state security personnel had been killed by the Al Shabaab within Kenya against 0 before. Individuals who got injured in the various terror attacks in Kenya between 16th October 2011 and 16th June 2015 also included 1,870 civilians, 83 police officers, 50 soldiers and 2 Government officers. On the other hand, terror kidnappings increased three-fold by 30th June 2015: from 4 before the operation to 12 individuals after the operation.

Massive destructions of property or facility and disruptions of activities/events and processes were witnessed between October 16, 2011 and June 30, 2015. These facilities ranged from private property or business, vehicles and equipment, entertainment facilities, religious premises and equipment, premises and equipment used by humanitarians, residential premises and government facilities. Both Christian and Muslim places of worship were attacked by the Al Shabaab, in Nairobi, Garissa, Mombasa and Mandera.

Police, military and civilian government facilities including immigration/border posts, administration police patrol bases and police stations in various parts of the country became high-risk targets for acts of terrorism. Kiambeni, Pangani, Mpeketoni are among the most attacked police stations.

Kenya's military operation in Somalia contributed to poor performance of Kenya's economy. This manifested in the negligible 0.5% economic growth it recorded in 2012-2013 financial year. (Okwir, 2015). The tourism sector which accounted for 12% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) recorded a 7% fall in 2014 which the Cabinet Secretary then responsible for tourism Ms. Phylis Kandie attributed to increased terror activities in the country particularly its intensification in 2013" (Githaiga, 2014). This led to loss of jobs in the tourism and hospitality industries.

The operation made the country to concentrate much of its finances to the fight against the Al Shabaab neglecting other critical service and revenue-generating sectors. Kenyan shillings 210 million (US\$2.8 million) per month, this being personnel costs alone, in 2012 making the country to record a Kenyan shillings 236 billion (US\$3.1 billion) total budget deficit (Crisis Group Africa, 2012). By June, 2015, KDF financial allocation by the state had increased by more than Kenya Shillings 70 billion per annum.

A number of business properties were destroyed and business activities were also disrupted by various terror attacks that occurred in Kenya from the time of its military operation in Somalia. Most of these business enterprises were hotels, restaurants and clubs, except the Sasha Boutique in the Assanands Building. These had negative multiplier effects on the economy of the country alongside other social problems such as unemployment and economic back-fall.

7.2.3. Kenya's Vulnerability to Terrorism Since it Launched Military Operation against Al Shabaab in Somalia

Kenya's military operation in Somalia may have been intended to be both pre-emptive and preventive, aiming at increasing Kenya's capabilities and hardening it against terrorism hence

restoring confidence that it was a safe state immune to terrorism. However, the findings demonstrate that vulnerability has significantly increased, a clear indication that the operation was not the best option.

National security organs (the security departments) have become terror targets, especially the police (personnel, duty stations and equipment). In addition, the security of strategic installations, especially essential ones such as water and oil reservoirs and pipelines, has deteriorated. They have since increasingly become terror targets. Further, domestic radicalization and emergence of terrorist cells in the country are on the rise since Kenya launched the operation. Finally, the Al Shabaab, as a survival strategy, has turned to local supports from Kenyans a good number of which it has carried recruitment of youths, Muslims and Christians alike.

In assessing Kenya's vulnerability the study found that the Al Shabaab has turned to attacking national security organs alongside ordinary targets. Besides killing injuring and kidnapping a number of the security personnel, they have destroyed their work stations and equipment and disrupted their operations. The terrorists are turning to critical infrastructure and particularly intelligence equipment and networks, power grid systems, oil pipelines, water reservoirs, tanks and pipes and institutions of learning.

Domestic radicalization was rapidly taking place. Some individuals sympathized with, joined and/or financed the Al Shabaab irrespective of religious subscription.

Foreign missions in the country, such as the British High Commission, for a long time advised their staff to avoid routes passing through 'unsecure' residences. The state of fear of terrorism in

the country has been informed by intelligence reports from the West and the subsequent terror events witnessed almost as precisely claimed by the foreign intelligence sources, the government having unfortunately ignored them.

The study found that terrorism has become one of the main security threats, causing fear and desperation among the population. People could not go about their normal business in the institutions of learning, residential areas in Nairobi City, Mombasa, Mandera, Garissa, Lamu and Malindi and in the refugee camps, in work stations, worship centers, and recreation and entertainment facilities.

In view of the findings, people question their security at workplaces, in public transport, in places of worship, in residential areas in the urban, among others, which are perceived to be insecure. People fear going about their normal business for they could fall victim to terrorists and, along the coast, to the military as well. Tourism has been hampered, with hotels closing down in Mombasa for example. Generally, since Kenya launched military operation against the Al Shabaab in Somalia, it became increasingly prone to terror attacks, finally becoming vulnerable, its capacities having worn out with the perceptions of insecurity gripping Kenyans between 16th October, 2011 and 30th June, 2015.

7.3. Conclusion

In the context of the realist claim, the study sought to find out the effect of Kenya's military operation in Somalia, Operation *Linda Nchi*, on Kenya's domestic security. As expressed in the justification and problem statement, the frequency of terror events, vulnerability of the state security and the cost of the terror events, especially in the face of soaring unemployment and fall

in the performance of key economic sectors during that period, were to be assessed and the knowledge thereof made available.

Kenya's operation in Somalia seemed to be moving towards incapacitating the Al Shabaab at the initial stages. The idea of creating a buffer zone seemed to be realized, which even informed the declaration of the end of the operation and KDF re-hatting into AMISOM. However, this was hardly any success, as it thereafter invited increased terror events, with astronomical costs, increased vulnerability and fear, which further deteriorated Kenya's domestic security.

The goal of the operation indeed failed as the Al Shabaab still penetrated into Kenya. In the circumstances, Kenya experienced many negative consequences, the details of which are keenly captured in the study.

From the findings, the incursion into Somalia was followed by an upsurge in terrorism. There was at least a terror event every month, and the increase was sustained in the long-run, accompanied by increase in the cost of terrorism. Although it is unrealistic to expect that every attack can be prevented, it is demonstrated in this study that the retaliatory terror attacks had a highly negative effect on the country and its security situation. Kenya has become more vulnerable to terrorism, with increased attacks on the security departments, personnel and strategic infrastructure including water supply facilities and oil pipelines. The domestic population operates in fear for their lives and property in residential areas, work stations, in places of worship, in learning institutions, hospitals and in recreation and entertainment places, just to mention but a few.

The attacks were directly targeted at Kenya, not at foreign interests in the country as had been the case before, indicating that they were indeed reprisal attacks as a result of Kenya's operation

in Somalia. They were carried out largely by light weapons, such as hand held grenades or IEVDs, mostly with origin in China and Russia, showing that the state security and intelligence organs were failing in detection of penetration and interception of such weapons and the materials for making them. Most of the terror attacks were carried out by the locals, indicating a highly radicalizing population against a highly deteriorating security and intelligent organs. Previously the attacks that took place in the country did not affect any religious institution, but thereafter attacks were targeted at religious places, mosques and churches alike, indicating religious fundamentalism. This extended fear to places of worship.

The findings thus point to the antithesis of the pre-emptive neutralization theory that military operation against terrorists abroad ends terrorism and that if it does not, then it disrupts the terrorists and their capacity to operate, therefore, denying them opportunity to carry out further terrorism in the pursuing state. The findings indeed prove wrong Kenya's justification that by executing military operation on the Al Shabaab in Somalia its domestic security could be enhanced. Kenya's military operation in Somalia has not enhanced its own domestic security; therefore, it is clear that hot pursuit is not the best strategy for combating terrorism. The conclusion from this study is that transnational terrorists may not be defeated by military means alone.

7.4. Recommendations

The study made the following recommendations:

1. The Government of Kenya needs to:
 1. The Kenyan government should scale up its intelligence gathering, processing, sharing and utilisation with the view to enhancing its ability to detect and

intercept potential terror events. On the same note, the government should trust and act on the basis of terror alerts or intelligence information from foreign countries.

2. The government needs to investigate the source of the light weapons used in the terror attacks between 16th October, 2011 and 30th June, 2015, and enhance its diplomatic engagements and international cooperation with China and Russia in effectively fighting the infiltration of China or Russia-made grenades, bombs, guns and IED and bomb-making materials into the hands of the Al Shabaab.
3. The government needs to accurately profile the ‘radicalizers’ and funders of radicalization and find ways of freezing the funds and device civic mechanisms targeted at shielding the minds of susceptible youth from radical influence. This entails crafting and rolling out a narrative that inculcates nationalism, patriotism and brotherhood to be championed by the National Integration and Cohesion Commission.
4. The government should beef up security in terms of personnel and equipment and surveillance at police stations, worship places, military camps, business premises, entertainment places, institutions of learning, immigration points, tourism attraction and accommodation places.
5. There is need to establish inter-agency coordination for purposes of responding to attacks. The specialized terror response unit, involving the police (the ATPU), KDF, NIS, NCTC, the Red Cross (or any other aid agency), bomb experts, Ministry of Health, would get to the scene and handle casualties, carry out

evacuation and vet the information on the terror event for purposes of reducing fear among the public and providing useful advice.

6. Kenya needs to review its policy holding KDF forces in Somalia to reduce Kenya's susceptibility to reprisal attacks from the Al Shabaab, their networks and/or sympathizers.
2. The Public should be extra vigilant and should report any suspicious matter to the agencies in charge of security to help curb terrorism.
3. For further study, further studies and research are encouraged on Kenya's military operations against the Al Shabaab in Somalia expanding the scope of study to beyond June 2015; incorporating classified information on the subject; and extending data methodology to a mixed statistical approach to advance the conclusions of this study and the resolution of the debate on the effect of counterterrorism on domestic security.

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Appendix A

Interview Schedules for Members of the Public

Introduction

This interview schedule is to help in gathering information on the effect of Kenya's military operation in Somalia on its domestic security. Mainly, it is to explore the extent to which the operation has enhanced Kenya's domestic security since the operation was launched by investigating by what extent has the frequency of terror incidents changed; the extent to which the cost of terrorism have changed and; how Kenyans feel about their safety and the general security in the country as at the moment. Your response will generally contribute to the debate on the effect of counterterrorism on domestic security. Specifically, it will help the researcher to evaluate the outcome of Operation *Linda Nchi*. Please respond as honestly as you can to all the Questions. Feel free to make further comments you may wish. The responses you give will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTERVIEWEE

Date of Interview.....Time.....Place.....

Name of Organization.....

Designation/Role of Interviewee.....

QUESTIONS/ISSUES

1. How does terrorism affect domestic security?
2. How has the frequency of terror events in Kenya changed since Kenya executed military operation on Al Shabaab in Somalia?
3. How has the cost terrorism changed in terms of deaths, injuries, destructions and disruptions since Kenya executed military operation on Al Shabaab in Somalia?
4. How has Kenya's military operation in Somalia affected domestic radicalization Kenya?
5. How has domestic radicalization and emergence of terrorist cells in Kenya affected Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism?
6. How safe are you from terrorist violence or threats at home, as you travel and at work now?
7. What do you say about Kenya's decision to execute military operation in Somalia?

Appendix B

Interview Schedule for Governments Officers (Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence (& KDF) and, EAC & Tourism)

Introduction

This interview schedule is to help in gathering information on the effect of Kenya's military operation in Somalia on its domestic security. Mainly, it is to explore the extent to which the operation has enhanced Kenya's domestic security since the operation was launched by investigating by what extent has the frequency of terror incidents changed; the extent to which the cost of terrorism have changed and; how Kenyans feel about their safety and the general security in the country as at the moment. Your response will generally contribute to the debate on the effect of counterterrorism on domestic security. Specifically, it will help the researcher to evaluate the outcome of Operation *Linda Nchi*. Please respond as honestly as you can to all the Questions. Feel free to make further comments you may wish. The responses you give will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTERVIEWEE

Date of Interview.....Time.....Place.....

Name of Organization.....

Designation/Role of Interviewee.....

QUESTIONS/ISSUES

1. What do you say about Kenya's decision to execute military operation in Somalia?
2. To what extent did the KDF operations in Somalia affect the capacity and capability of the Al Shabaab?
3. How has the frequency of terror events changed in Kenya since it launched military operation on Al Shabaab?
4. How did the operation affect deaths and injuries, kidnappings by terrorists in Kenya?
5. How did the KDF operations along border points affect the security of civilians in Kenya?
6. How has terrorism affected the tourism industry in Kenya?
7. How has the Operation *Linda Nchi* promoted Al Shabaab domestic recruitment and radicalization in Kenya?
8. Do you consider yourself, family, relatives and friends safe from terrorist threats or violence at home, workplace, in social places, when travelling?

Appendix C

Interview Schedule for Government Officers (Ministry of Interior Affairs, Police & CID)

Introduction

This interview schedule is to help in gathering information on the effect of Kenya's military operation in Somalia on its domestic security. Mainly, it is to explore the extent to which the operation has enhanced Kenya's domestic security since the operation was launched by investigating by what extent has the frequency of terror incidents changed; the extent to which the cost of terrorism have changed and; how Kenyans feel about their safety and the general security in the country as at the moment. Your response will generally contribute to the debate on the effect of counterterrorism on domestic security. Specifically, it will help the researcher to evaluate the outcome of Operation *Linda Nchi*. Please respond as honestly as you can to all the Questions. Feel free to make further comments you may wish. The responses you give will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTERVIEWEE

Date of Interview.....Time.....Place.....

Name of Organization.....

Designation/Role of Interviewee.....

QUESTIONS/ISSUES

1. How frequent were terror events in Kenya before the operation was launched?
2. What implication did the military operation have on the capacity and capability of the Al Shabaab?
3. How has the operation changed the frequency of terror events in Kenya?
4. How has the operation changed fatalities and injuries, destructions, hostages and kidnappings from terror events?
5. How have the terror events in the country affected security institutions, personnel and their equipment?
6. How has terrorism affected Kenya's vulnerability to terror events?
7. How has the Operation *Linda Nchi* promoted Al Shabaab domestic recruitment and radicalization in Kenya?
8. Do you consider yourself and Kenya secure from terrorism?